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BLIND SPOT IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE NEED FOR FEDERAL
INTERVENTION IN THE SOBER LIVING HOME INDUSTRY
AND THE PATH TO MAKING IT HAPPEN†
ABSTRACT
The United States federal government is fighting the nation’s addiction
epidemic harder than ever before. Billions of federal dollars are invested each
year in substance use disorder treatment and prevention in amounts that have
more than doubled over the last decade—yet addiction is still winning, and
winning big. Substance use disorder claimed the lives of a record-breaking
nearly 160,000 Americans in 2019. One of the epidemic’s biggest obstacles has
turned out to be within the nation’s substance use disorder treatment industry
itself: fraudulent treatment providers are getting rich quick off a broken,
unregulated system. This Comment discusses the sober living home industry, a
place in the substance use disorder continuum of care where fraud and abuse
are not only most pervasive, but also almost entirely beyond the bounds of
government regulation. In 88% of states, anyone can legally open a sober living
home facility with zero inspection or oversight. A rapidly growing influx of bad
players takes advantage of this blind spot by luring in potential residents with
patient brokering schemes, pocketing residents’ cash, and hiking up their
insurance bills with excessively expensive and unnecessary drug tests.
This Comment asserts that current federal and state attempts to intervene in
the sober living industry have no teeth. Moreover, despite federalism-based
objections, federal efforts, as opposed to solely-state based efforts, offer the only
effective solution for meaningful intervention in the sober living industry. Yet,
the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment significantly hinders
the federal government’s ability to regulate the industry. This Comment makes
the case that the Commerce Clause provides an unusual, but not unheard of,
path for the federal government to step into state health care sectors to eliminate
the sober living industry’s bad players. Pursuant to its Commerce Clause
authority, Congress can, and should, enact a federal law that creates minimum
quality standards and accreditation requirements for operating a sober living
home in the United States.

†

This Comment received the Mary Laura “Chee” Davis Award for Writing Excellence.
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INTRODUCTION
The federal government is spending an unprecedented amount of money in
its battle against drug addiction, more than doubling its funding over the last
decade.1 So, why is the government still losing this battle, worse than ever
before? Last year, drug overdose death rates reached an all-time high—94,134
Americans fatally overdosed.2 Currently, an average of 95,000 deaths per year

1
See NAT’L CTR. DRUG ABUSE STAT., DRUG ABUSE STATISTICS (2020), https://drugabusestatistics.org/.
Federal spending on addiction treatment and prevention totaled to $17.6 billion for the year 2020, compared to
$8.5 billion in 2008. Id. The overall requested National Drug Control budget for 2020 totaled $34.6 billion. Id.
2
CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 12 Month-Ending Provisional Counts and Percent Change of
Drug Overdose Deaths, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/drug-overdose-data.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
Compare id. (reporting provisional number of reported overdoses over a 12-month period ending in January
2021), with NAT’L INST. DRUG ABUSE, Overdose Death Rates, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/trendsstatistics/overdose-death-rates (last visited Sept. 2, 2021) (reporting 38,329 overdose deaths in 2010).
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are attributable to alcoholism.3 Death is not the only factor in this battle: life for
the 20.4 million Americans suffering from substance use disorder (SUD)4 is
wrought with devastating impacts on physical and mental well-being and ability
to function in society,5 the effects of which are felt by a SUD patient’s entire
family.6 In addition to its impact on human life, SUD costs the nation’s economy
an estimated average of $740 billion annually.7
There is little mystery as to why addiction keeps winning. The federal
government recognizes that a major obstacle to progress in the SUD epidemic,
the “treatment gap,” has remained persistent despite federal efforts. The
treatment gap refers to the staggering deficit of individuals with SUD who are
not receiving the treatment they need. In the words of the Office of National
Drug Control Policy’s director Jim Carroll, “only 12 percent of people with
[SUD] are getting the treatment they need. . . . [I]n context . . . the treatment gap
is about 18.2 million people.”8 This gap is not situated between a SUD patient
and some form of SUD treatment, but between a SUD patient and effective SUD
treatment. A key feature of the treatment gap is that many individuals with SUD
receive poor quality, clinically inappropriate, or fraudulent treatment.9
This Comment will focus on the sober living home industry, where
fraudulent, unethical, and clinically inappropriate SUD treatment is not only the
most apparent, but also remains largely beyond the reach of federal regulation.

3

NAT’L CTR. DRUG ABUSE STAT., ALCOHOL ABUSE STATISTICS (2019), https://drugabusestatistics.org/.
KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE
2019 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 3 (2020), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/
reports/rpt29393/2019NSDUHFFRPDFWHTML/2019NSDUHFFR090120.htm. SUD is an umbrella diagnosis
that includes all specific drug use disorders and alcohol use disorder. Id.
5
See, e.g., NAT’L INST. DRUG ABUSE, Health Consequences of Drug Misuse: Introduction (June 9,
2020), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/health-consequences-drug-misuse/introduction.
6
See, e.g., Laura Lander, Janie Howsare, & Marilyn Byrne, The Impact of Substance Use Disorders on
Families and Children: From Theory to Practice, 28 SOC. WORK PUB. HEALTH 194 (2013) (analyzing effects of
SUD on families).
7
Nat’l Inst. Drug Abuse, Costs of Substance Abuse (2020), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugtopics/trends-statistics/costs-substance-abuse#supplemental-references-for-economic-costs (estimating annual
cost of alcohol, illicit and prescription drug abuse in relation to healthcare, lost work productivity, and crime).
8
Press Release, American Presidency Project, Remarks by ONDCP Director Jim Carroll, Turning the
Tide: Improving Access to Addiction Care and Overcoming Obstacles to Parity (Sept. 9, 2019)
(transcript available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/press-release-remarks-ondcp-director-jimcarroll-turning-the-tide-improving-access).
9
OFF. NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: NATIONAL TREATMENT
PLAN FOR SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER 2020, at 12 (2020), https://www.opioidlibrary.org/wp-content/uploads/
2020/02/2020-NDCS-Treatment-Plan.pdf.
4
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Sober living homes,10 colloquially known as halfway houses,11 may be described
as a step-down means of care from rehabilitation treatment centers.12 They are
substance-free, safe, healthy living environments that promote recovery from
SUD, help recovering individuals reintegrate to daily life, and establish a
foundation for long-term recovery.13 Typically, sober living homes are an
individual’s “last step” in the continuum of care for SUD14—most individuals
enter sober living homes either after completing residential rehabilitation
treatment, during and after outpatient rehabilitation treatment, or following a
stay in a hospital detox15 center.16
Although ethically-run sober living homes are valuable to lasting SUD
recovery, in the past decade there has been a rapid increase of “bad players” that
capitalize on the growing industry to pocket residents’ cash or insurance
payments.17 In forty-four of the fifty U.S. states, any individual or entity may
legally open a sober living home without undergoing any formal certification
and may operate a facility without any regulation.18 This influx of bad players is
10
There are a variety of terms used to refer to sober living homes. See, e.g., Substance Use—Disorder
Prevention That Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act (“SUPPORT
Act”), Pub. L. No. 115–271, § 7031, 132 Stat. 3894, 4014 (2018) (using term “recovery housing”); NAT’L
ASSOC. OF RECOVERY RESIDENCES (NARR), A PRIMER ON RECOVERY RESIDENCES (2012), https://narronline.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Primer-on-Recovery-Residences-09-20-2012a.pdf (using the term “recovery
residence”); Sober Living Homes, ADDICTIONCENTER.COM, https://www.addictioncenter.com/treatment/soberliving-homes/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2021) (using the term “sober living”). For purposes of clarity and consistency,
this Comment will use the term “sober living.”
11
Although they offer similar services, the term “halfway house” differs from “sober living” in that
halfway houses typically only accept recently incarcerated individuals. E.g., Is There a Difference Between a
Sober House and a Halfway House?, HARRIS HOUSE (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.harrishousestl.org/is-there-adifference-between-a-sober-house-and-a-halfway-house/.
12
See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, TREATMENT APPROACHES FOR DRUG ADDICTION (2019) (recovery
housing often serves a transitional purpose following “other types of inpatient or residential treatment”).
13
See NARR, supra note 10, at 5 (defining basic attributes of sober living homes).
14
NAT’L COUNS. FOR BEHAV. HEALTH, BUILDING RECOVERY: STATE POLICY GUIDE FOR SUPPORTING
RECOVERY HOUSING 2 (2018), https://www.thenationalcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/18_RecoveryHousing-Toolkit_5.3.2018.pdf?daf=375ateTbd56 (describing sober living’s role in the larger continuum of
addiction treatment).
15
“Detox” refers to the “[m]edically supervised withdrawal” from drugs or alcohol which takes place at
either a hospital’s regular medical ward, a specialized inpatient detox unit, or an outpatient service under close
medical supervision. Treatment Options, FINDTREATMENT (Oct. 2019), https://findtreatment.gov/content/
treatment-options/what-happens-next/.
16
NARR, supra note 10, at 15 (“Studies to date of [sober living homes] reveal that the vast majority of
. . . residents have a history of inpatient or outpatient addiction treatment.”).
17
See infra Part I.B.
18
ERIC MARTIN, KRISTI MCKINNEY, MICHAEL RAZAVI, & VAN BURNHAM, NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF
RECOVERY
HOUSING
ACCREDITATION,
LEGISLATION
AND
LICENSING
5–6
(2020),
https://mhacbo.org/media/filer_public/2e/fd/2efd1a20-9558-4329-8683-0e2367cbbc2b/nationaloverview
recoveryhousingjanuary2020.pdf. As of January 2020, only six states have licensure requirements for sober
living homes: Arizona, Hawaii, Maryland, Utah, and Wyoming require licensing for all sober living homes,
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pushing back against the government’s efforts to close the treatment gap and
putting the lives of an untold number of SUD patients at risk.19
This Comment will argue for the following: (1) federal, as opposed to solely
state-based, intervention in the sober living industry is needed; (2) present
federal efforts to eradicate bad players from the industry fall short of meaningful
impact; (3) even if present efforts improve, federalism-based constraints further
limit meaningful federal intervention; and (4) a federalism-friendly solution for
meaningful intervention may be achieved by enacting, pursuant to Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause, a federal law that sets minimum
standards and accreditation requirements for operating a sober living home in
the United States.
This Comment will proceed in five parts. Part I shows why there is a need
for federal intervention in the sober living industry. It first elaborates upon the
importance of sober living homes in the SUD continuum of care. It next
demonstrates the prevalence of fraud, abuse, and inadequate care in the sober
living industry and highlights two bad practices: urinalysis drug testing and
patient brokering.
Part II explains why present federal efforts to intervene in the sober living
industry under provisions of the Substance Use Disorder Prevention That
Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act of
2018 (SUPPORT Act) have no teeth.20 First, implementation of the “Ensuring
Access to Quality Sober Living” provision of the SUPPORT Act identifies, but
does little to solve, the industry’s problems.21 Moreover, the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) and Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA), the agencies charged with administering
the provision, failed to adequately realize their statutory duties. Second, the bulk
of the sober living industry’s bad players fall outside the scope of the Federal
Trade Commission’s (FTC) SUPPORT Act authority.22
while Arkansas requires licensing of sober living homes only if they provide post-prison housing. Id. Twentyseven states encourage sober living homes to seek certification from a third-party non-profit organization, but
do not require third-party certification. Id.
19
This number is quite literally untold, as “[t]o date, there has been no systematic inventory” of sober
living homes in the United States—a result of the industry’s widespread lack of federal and state oversight. See
NARR, supra note 10, at 9.
20
Substance Use—Disorder Prevention That Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and
Communities Act (“SUPPORT Act”), Pub. L. No. 115–271, 132 Stat. 3894, 4014 (2018).
21
SUPPORT Act § 7031 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 290ee–5).
22
These provisions include the “Opioid Addiction Recovery Fraud Prevention Act of 2018” and
“Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act.” Id. §§ 8021–8023 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(d)); Id.
§ 8122 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 220).
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Part III analyzes two major Tenth Amendment-based objections to
meaningful federal intervention. The first objection—that absent a compelling
need for the federal government to step in, intervention in the sober living
industry should be left to the states out of respect for federalism principles—is
not valid for three reasons: (1) there is no regulatory diversity among the few
states that have acted; (2) allowing states to regulate on their own timelines has
prompted a spread of bad players to new regions; and (3) uniform nationwide
measures are necessary for achieving meaningful intervention. However, the
second objection—that federal regulation of the sober living industry violates
the doctrine of anti-commandeering—does prevent the federal government from
compelling states to regulate the sober living industry in accordance with federal
intent, absent the authority of one of its other constitutionally enumerated
powers. While use of congressional spending powers would typically provide
the federal government a loophole at this anti-commandeering crossroad, sober
living homes fall outside the scope of spending powers authority because they
seldom accept government insurance.
Part IV proposes a federalism-friendly solution for meaningful federal
intervention in the sober living industry that is unusual, but not unheard of. The
federal government can regulate the sober living industry within the bounds of
the Tenth Amendment by enacting minimum standards and accreditation
requirements pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Although this
kind of legislation necessarily requires regulation of an intrastate activity, where
Congress’s commerce powers are most constrained, such legislation would
nevertheless comply with the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence because
(1) the operation of sober living homes constitutes an economic, as opposed to
non-economic, activity; (2) Congress can rationally conclude that operating a
sober living home belongs to a class of activities that, when aggregated in all
instances, substantially affects interstate commerce; and (3) although setting a
minimum accreditation requirement would regulate legitimate sober living
homes in addition to those run by bad players, such a requirement would
nonetheless constitute a reasonable method for eliminating the negative effects
of sober living homes on interstate commerce. Moreover, the Commerce Clause
has been used to regulate in the intrastate health care sector before with the
enactment the Mammography Quality Standards Act (MQSA),23 under
circumstances strikingly similar to those of the sober living industry.
Finally, Part V provides general recommendations for how the federal
legislation proposed by this Comment should be structured.
23

Mammography Quality Standards Reauthorization Act of 1998, 42 U.S.C.A. § 263b.
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THE NEED FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN THE
SOBER LIVING INDUSTRY

The following Part demonstrates why federal intervention in the sober living
industry is necessary. It first explains the crucial role that sober living homes
play in establishing long-term recovery from SUD, followed by a depiction of
the fraud, abuse, and poor quality of care besetting the sober living industry. It
then highlights the two most prevalent bad practices plaguing the industry’s
efficacy and endangering the lives of its customers: (1) fraudulent urinalysis
drug testing and (2) patient brokering.
A. The Role of Sober Living Homes in the SUD Continuum of Care
A scientific explanation of the symptoms and long-term effects of SUD
illustrates the significance of sober living homes in the SUD continuum of care.
A lasting alteration of brain wiring explains the strong probability that a SUD
patient will relapse long after they terminate substance use—more than 60% of
SUD patients relapse within the first year after discharge from an inpatient or
outpatient treatment center.24 The degree to which these brain changes reverse
and the length of time any reversal would take remains unknown, although
studies indicate that an increased risk of relapse persists for many years.25
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM-5)
identifies the essential feature of SUD as “a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and
physiological symptoms indicating that the individual continues using [a]
substance despite significant substance-related problems.”26 A crucial
characteristic of SUD is that, over time, misuse of a substance may affect
underlying changes in a patient’s brain circuits, rewiring the brain’s chemistry
and behavior in a manner that persists long after a substance has been detoxified
from a patient’s system.27 Recently, “[w]ell-supported scientific evidence” led
the medical community to recognize SUD as a chronic brain disease that (1)
24
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (HHS), FACING ADDICTION IN AMERICA: THE SURGEON GENERAL’S
REPORT ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS, & HEALTH ch. 2, at 2 (2016) (first citing A. T. McLellan, C. P. O’Brien, & H. D.
Kleber, Drug Dependence, a Chronic Medical Illness: Implications for Treatment, Insurance, and Outcomes
Evaluation, 25 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 1689, 1689–95 (2000); then citing R. L. Hubbard, S. G. Craddock, & J.
Anderson, Overview of 5-Year Follow-up Outcomes in the Drug Abuse Treatment Outcome Studies, 25 J.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 125, 125–34 (2003)).
25
Id. (first citing Y.-I. Hser, V. Hoffman, C. E. Grella, & M. D. Anglin, A 33-Year Follow-Up of
Narcotics Addicts, 58 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 503, 503–08 (2001); then citing G.E. VAILLANT, THE
NATURAL HISTORY OF ALCOHOLISM REVISITED (1995)).
26
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDER (DSM-5)
483 (5th ed. 2013).
27
Id.
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“enable[s] substance-associated [stimuli] to trigger substance seeking”; (2)
“reduces sensitivity of brain systems involved in the experience of pleasure or
reward”; (3) heightens the brain’s stress systems; and (4) “reduce[s] functioning
of executive control systems,” which weakens the ability to regulate impulses,
actions, emotions, and decision-making skills.28 In short, SUD significantly
diminishes the capacity to voluntarily control substance use and significantly
impairs health and social functioning.29
The nature of SUD as a chronic brain disease illuminates the importance of
sober living homes. Although 60% of SUD patients relapse within the first year
after discharge from an inpatient or outpatient treatment program, research
demonstrates that residing in a (non-corrupt) sober living home following a more
intensive form of treatment decreases the likelihood of relapse.30 In addition to
simply prolonging the length of time spent in a substance-free environment,
legitimate sober living homes help individuals build what is known as “recovery
capital.”31 Recovery capital is “the accumulation of financial, social, human, and
cultural resources” recognized as essential to the initiation, stabilization, and
sustainment of long-term recovery from SUD.32 Moreover, studies show a
correlation between sober living home residency and other positive outcomes,
such as lower incarceration rates,33 increased employment,34 higher income,35
and “[i]mproved family functioning.”36
28

HHS, supra note 24, at ch. 2, at 1–2.
Id. at ch. 2, at 1.
30
See, e.g., Amy Mericle, Elizabeth Mahoney, Rachael Korcha, Kevin Delucchi, & Douglas L. Polcin,
Sober Living House Characteristics: A Multilevel Analyses of Factors Associated with Improved Outcomes, 98
J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 28, 28 (2019); Douglas Polcin, Gantt P. Galloway, & Rachael Korcha, What
Did We Learn from Our Study on Sober Living Houses and Where Do We Go from Here?, 42 J. PSYCHOACTIVE
DRUGS 425, 425 (2010); Leonard A. Jason, Margaret Davis, & Joseph R. Ferrari, The Need for Substance Abuse
After-Care: Longitudinal Analysis of Oxford House, 32 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 803 (2007); Leonard A. Jason,
Joseph R. Ferrari, & Bradley Olson, Communal Housing Settings Enhance Substance Abuse Recovery, 96 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1727, 1727–29 (2006).
31
See, e.g., Mericle et al., supra note 30, at 29; NAT’L COUNCIL BEHAV. HEALTH, RECOVERY HOUSING
ISSUE BRIEF: INFORMATION FOR STATE POLICYMAKERS 2 (2017). See generally William White & William
Cloud, Recovery Capital: A Primer for Addictions Professionals, 9 COUNS. 22, 24 (2008) (providing a
conceptual overview of “recovery capital”).
32
Mericle et al., supra note 30, at 29. See generally White & Cloud, supra note 31, at 22 (providing
conceptual overview of “recovery capital”).
33
NAT’L COUNCIL BEHAV. HEALTH, RECOVERY HOUSING ISSUE BRIEF: INFORMATION FOR STATE
POLICYMAKERS, supra note 31, at 2 (citing Jason et al., Communal Housing Settings Enhance Substance Abuse
Recovery, supra note 30, at 1727–29).
34
Id. (citing Polcin et al., Sober Living House Characteristics: A Multilevel Analyses of Factors
Associated with Improved Outcomes, supra note 30).
35
Id. (citing Amy Mericle, Jennifer Miles, & Fred Way, Recovery Residences and Providing Safe and
Supportive Housing for Individuals Overcoming Addiction, 45 J. DRUG ISSUES 368 (2015)).
36
Id. (citing Leonard A. Jason, Darrin M. Aase, David G. Mueller, & Joseph R. Ferrari, Current and
29
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B. Fraud, Abuse, and Inadequate Care in the Sober Living Industry
The sober living industry is unique in the SUD continuum of care because it
has no watchdogs. Unlike inpatient and outpatient treatment providers, sober
living homes are rarely covered by insurance.37 Treatment providers at earlier
stages in the SUD continuum of care and general healthcare industry, by virtue
of insurance coverage and Medicare funding, are policed by private insurers,
states, and sometimes the federal government.38 In 2010, the passage of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) required that all insurers cover SUD services and
treatment.39 Sober living homes, however, do not fall within the ACA’s
mandatory coverage requirement because they are not medical “treatment
facilities.”40 Furthermore, due to lack of state licensing, sober living homes are
expected to be financially independent in most states, and subsequently will
rarely accept private or state health insurance.41
Because the sober living industry operates outside of more regulated
healthcare systems, the industry attracts unscrupulous providers that manipulate
weaknesses of the industry itself, and of countless unknowing SUD patients
seeking long-term recovery.42 In recent years, media investigations brought
attention to bad practices plaguing the industry.43 The nationwide prevalence of
these issues is further evidenced by the federal government’s explicit recognition

Previous Residents of Self-Governed Recovery Homes: Characteristics of Long-Term Recovery, 27
ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT QUARTERLY 442 (2009)).
37
NAT’L COUNCIL BEHAV. HEALTH, BUILDING RECOVERY: STATE POLICY GUIDE FOR SUPPORTING
RECOVERY HOUSING, supra note 14, at 10.
38
See generally NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS., Combating Health Care Fraud and Abuse, NO. 11 ISSUE
BRIEFS STATE LEGIS. (2010) (providing overview of how federal, state, and private entities prevent health care
fraud and abuse).
39
42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b)(1)(E) (West).
40
Laura Close, Does Insurance Pay for Sober Living?, AM. ADDICTION CTRS., https://www.
greenhousetreatment.com/sober-living/insurance/ (last updated Sept. 2, 2021); see also NAT’L COUNCIL BEHAV.
HEALTH, BUILDING RECOVERY: STATE POLICY GUIDE FOR SUPPORTING RECOVERY HOUSING, supra note 14, at
11 (noting although sober living homes may provide peer-led support and connect residents to outpatient
treatment, sober living homes themselves do not provide direct medical addiction services).
41
Close, supra note 40 (citing Polcin, et al., Sober Living Houses for Alcohol and Drug Dependence: 18Month Outcomes, supra note 30).
42
See NAT’L COUNCIL BEHAV. HEALTH, BUILDING RECOVERY: STATE POLICY GUIDE FOR SUPPORTING
RECOVERY HOUSING, supra note 14, at 2; SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., RECOVERY
HOUSING: BEST PRACTICES AND SUGGESTED MINIMUM GUIDELINES 10 (2019).
43
See, e.g., Francie Diep, The New Proposed Federal Guidelines for Sober Homes Are Disappointing,
Observers Say, PAC. STANDARD (Apr. 12, 2019), https://psmag.com/social-justice/the-feds-have-proposed-newguidelines-for-sober-homes-and-observers-are-deeply-disappointed (reporting “several recent and devastating
investigations” revealed bad practices that included astronomically overbilling for low quality services,
providing free drugs, and in some cases, assaulting residents); NAT’L COUNCIL BEHAV. HEALTH, BUILDING
RECOVERY: STATE POLICY GUIDE FOR SUPPORTING RECOVERY HOUSING, supra note 14, at 2.
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of and efforts to eliminate them.44 Two major unscrupulous practices in the sober
living industry that have arisen due to the current lack of meaningful regulation
are (1) urinalysis drug testing and (2) patient brokering.
1. Urinalysis Drug Testing: How Pee in a Cup Becomes Liquid Gold
Urinalysis drug testing is a long-standing practice in the sober living
industry.45 The American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM) advises sober
living facilities to drug test residents a maximum of once a week.46 The ASAM
further instructs that sober living homes should only use drug testing to (1) verify
an individual resident’s abstinence and use a positive test result to revise a
resident’s support plan and (2) maintain “the integrity of the facility as a safe
recovery environment” for all residents.47 Traditionally, SUD care providers
performed urine tests with common dipstick tests where a “change[] [in] color .
. . reflect[s] a positive or negative reading, costs some five dollars and can be
done anywhere.”48
However, insurance coverage changes over the past decade transformed this
once cheap and beneficial practice into a “liquid gold rush”49 for bad players.50
The ACA introduced a new requirement that insurers cover “laboratory
services,” including laboratory-run urinalysis drug testing, as an essential health
benefit.51 When the ACA took effect in 2014, bad players began a scheme of
charging insurers thousands of dollars for laboratory tests of sober living
residents’ urine.52 SAMHSA identifies three main tactics employed by bad
players to exploit the ACA’s laboratory coverage: (1) “[t]esting for quantitative
levels on negative samples”; (2) “[c]harging exorbitant amounts that are over
44

See infra discussion in Part II.
Katrice Bridge Copeland, Liquid Gold, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1451, 1478 (2020) (citing AM. SOC’Y OF
ADDICTION MED., PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT ON DRUG TESTING AS A COMPONENT OF ADDICTION TREATMENT
AND MONITORING PROGRAMS AND IN OTHER CLINICAL SETTINGS 1 (2010), https://perma.cc/AYN2-2WHL). See
generally AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED., DRUG TESTING: A WHITE PAPER OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
ADDICTION MEDICINE (2013) (providing historical overview of drug testing in the SUD industry).
46
ADDICTION MED., supra note 45, at 54.
47
Id. at 52.
48
Colton Wooten, My Years in the Florida Shuffle of Drug Addiction, NEW YORKER (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/10/21/my-years-in-the-florida-shuffle-of-drug-addiction.
49
The term “liquid gold” was first coined by reporter David Segal in his article In Pursuit of Liquid Gold,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/27/business/urine-test-cost.html.
“Liquid gold” is also the title of law professor Katrice Bridge Copeland’s seminal scholarly article on
exploitation in the addiction treatment industry. See Copeland, supra note 45.
50
Wooten, supra note 48.
51
42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b)(1)(H); Copeland, supra note 45, at 1471–72.
52
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 42, at 10; What Is the Florida
Shuffle?, https://www.fixthefloridashuffle.com/florida-shuffle (last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
45
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and above standard costs for” laboratory testing; and (3) testing residents with
excessive frequency.53 Unscrupulous providers may test residents two to four
times a week to maximize profits,54 in great excess of ASAM’s once a week
maximum.55 Some bad players strike deals with laboratories themselves to run
additional, unrelated, and expensive chemical tests on a urine sample, driving
up the insurance bill for a single drug test “from hundreds of dollars to thousands
of dollars.”56
Over the past few years, federal prosecutions and media reports have shed
light on fraudulent drug testing in the sober living industry. In August 2020,
Michael Ligotti, a doctor who acted as medical director for fifty Florida sober
living homes and treatment centers, was “charged with masterminding a $681
million scheme to bill private insurers and Medicare for unnecessary laboratory
testing and undelivered [SUD] services.”57 In 2017, Florida’s Kenny Chatman
pleaded guilty to collecting $16 million in insurance reimbursements for urine
testing by operating a string of fraudulent sober living homes and treatment
services.58 Chatman’s sober living homes not only provided inadequate services,
but actively encouraged clients to relapse, thus keeping clients from leaving
“treatment” and ensuring they continue to take urine tests.59
The fraud committed by Ligotti and Chatman was neither unique nor limited
to “a few bad apples” that might be expected to crop up in most major industries.
Rather, evidence suggests there may be more bad apples than good in the sober
living industry. In 2018, SAMHSA assembled an expert technical panel to
examine the prevalence of fraudulent laboratory drug testing in the sober living
industry.60 The results of the panel overwhelmingly confirmed that unscrupulous
providers exploit urine testing at a shocking frequency.61 For example, Fair
Health, a non-profit that analyzes consumer insurance statistics, examined
laboratory test claims data and found that “costs associated with urine testing
increased by more than 900% between 2011 and 2014,”62 a timeline that mirrors

53

SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 42, at 7.
Copeland, supra note 45, at 1480.
55
AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., supra note 45, at 54.
56
Copeland, supra note 45, at 1481.
57
Jodine Mayberry, Florida Doctor Charged in $681 Million Addiction Services Fraud, 26 No. 3 W.J.
HEALTH CARE FRAUD 4, 4 (2020).
58
Scott Cohn, Opioids’ Hidden Epidemic—Fraudulent Drug Treatment Centers, CNBC (June 29, 2018,
10:06 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/06/opioids-hidden-epidemicfraudulent-drug-treatment-centers.html.
59
Id.
60
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 42, at 10.
61
See id.
62
Id. (emphasis added).
54
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the enactment of the ACA’s lab coverage requirement through its first year in
effect.63
2. Patient Brokering
Patient brokering is a form of fraud where a third-party, the patient broker,
recruits a SUD patient to an unethical sober living home in exchange for a
financial kickback.64 Patient brokers recruit individuals suffering from SUD by
posting deceptive internet advertisements;65 prowling outside twelve-step
recovery meetings, drug courts, and inpatient treatment centers;66 or even
infiltrating treatment centers themselves.67 Brokers may lure individuals to an
unethical facility with promises of discounted rent, free plane tickets to an outof-state facility, or other incentives such as gym memberships, cigarettes, and
cellphones.68 Brokers are typically paid either on a “per-head” basis, “ranging
from $500 to $5,000” for each bed filled, or at a monthly rate that requires
brokers to meet a quota of recruits.69 While the recruited individual “believes
they are being referred by a responsible party who has their best interest at
heart,” patient brokers and the facilities that pay them are focused on financial
gain.70 The issue of patient brokering is largely unique to the SUD care system,
as opposed to the general health care system, because most health care sectors
do not possess the SUD industry’s inordinate potential for repeat customers.71
The fact that sober living homes lack the oversight of private insurers and

63
42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b)(1)(H); Timeline: Affordable Care Act, AFFORDABLE HEALTH CAL.,
http://affordablehealthca.com/timeline-obamacare/ (last updated Jan. 2020).
64
E.g., Examining Concerns of Patient Brokering and Addiction Treatment Fraud: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 115th Cong. (2017) [hereinafter
Patient Brokering Hearing] (statement of Gregg Harper, Rep. Mass.); Jim Peake & Christian Morris, Patient
Brokering in the Addiction Treatment Industry, ADDICTION-REP (Apr. 20, 2018), https://addiction-rep.com/blog/
patient-brokering-in-the-addiction-treatment-industry/.
65
Copeland, supra note 45, at 1475–76.
66
Patient Brokering Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Gregg Harper, Rep. Mass.).
67
What is Patient Brokering?, 499 RECOVERY (July 23, 2018), https://www.449recovery.org/what-ispatient-brokering/.
68
Patient Brokering Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Gregg Harper, Rep. Mass.); John Pacenti,
Patient Brokering: A Festering Wound for the Recovery Community, PALM BEACH POST, https://www.
palmbeachpost.com/news/local/patient-brokering-festering-wound-for-recovery-community/hTxetVZpPd2Lud
2kV4evoM/ (last updated Oct. 30, 2016, 1:15 AM).
69
David Armstrong & Evan Allen, The Addict Brokers: Middlemen Profit as Desperate Patients Are
‘Treated Like Paychecks’, STAT (May 28, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/05/28/addict-brokersopioids/ (interviewing ex-patient brokers).
70
Peake & Morris, supra note 64.
71
Id. When a treatment or surgery for most medical maladies concludes, it does not need to be “redone,”
whereas the strong likelihood of relapse for SUD patients creates the expectation for repeat customers. Id.
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Medicare providers that exists for other health care services exacerbates the
industry’s draw to patient brokers.72
Sober living homes profit from patient brokering by accumulating fees
clients privately pay to reside in their facility while providing little to no SUD
recovery services,73 pocketing insurance reimbursements for urinalysis testing,74
and collaborating with an unethical inpatient or outpatient treatment center.75 In
the third scenario, once an individual with SUD is in a sober living home, they
are incentivized with free drugs or other inducements to relapse, thereby
restarting another use cycle, which requires another referral back to inpatient or
outpatient treatment.76 Either the sober living home itself or a third-party patient
broker will then receive a kickback from the treatment center for the return
referral.77
The rapid rise of patient brokering and overuse of urinalysis drug testing
among unethical sober living homes have exploited and compromised the
important role of sober living homes in the SUD continuum of care. Federal
intervention that meaningfully remedies these issues is needed to address the
nation’s SUD epidemic and protect the well-being of SUD patients and their
families.
II. PRESENT FEDERAL EFFORTS TO INTERVENE IN THE SOBER LIVING
INDUSTRY HAVE NO TEETH
In October 2017, the Acting Secretary of HHS declared the opioid crisis a
public health emergency.78 One year later, President Trump signed the
SUPPORT Act, a bipartisan bill that primarily sought to address the opioid crisis
and shaped current federal response to all other subclassifications of SUD as
well.79 The Act incorporated and expanded upon prior legislative efforts to
72

See supra Part I.B.
Patient Brokering Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Gregg Harper, Rep. Mass.).
74
See Cohn, supra note 60.
75
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO–18–315, INFORMATION ON RECOVERY HOUSING
PREVALENCE, SELECTED STATES’ OVERSIGHT, AND FUNDING 8 n.16 (2018). Sober living homes may also partner
with drug testing laboratories in patient brokering schemes. Id.
76
Patient Brokering Hearing, supra note 64 (Statement of Gregg Harper, Rep. Mass.).
77
See id.
78
OFF. OF SEC’Y, HHS: DETERMINATION THAT A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY EXISTS (2017); Press Off.,
HHS: HHS Acting Secretary Declares Public Health Emergency to Address National Opioid Crisis (Oct. 26,
2017), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/10/26/hhs-acting-secretary-declares-public-health-emergency-addressnational-opioid-crisis.html.
79
See SUPPORT Act, Pub. L. No. 115–271, 132 Stat. 3894 (2018); The SUPPORT for Patients and
Communities Act (H.R. 6), AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED., https://www.asam.org/advocacy/the-support-for73
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confront SUD issues, including the 21st Century Cures Act of 2018 and the
Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016.80 The SUPPORT Act’s
sweeping design imposes duties across a wide range of federal agencies.81 The
Act also comprised the first ever targeted federal effort to eliminate bad practices
and bad players in the sober living industry.82
Although the SUPPORT Act signifies the federal government has turned its
attention to issues of fraud and abuse in the sober living industry, in practice, it
does not achieve much beyond memorializing federal attention. This Part
explains why the three SUPPORT Act provisions relevant to the sober living
industry have failed to provide meaningful intervention. While Subtitle D of the
Act, which imposes duties on HSS and SAMHSA to facilitate best practices and
indicators of fraud in the sober living industry, does identify the industry’s
issues, it does not solve them.83 Subtitles B and J, which enable the FTC to
prosecute certain instances of fraud within the SUD industry in general, are both
subject to restrictions that negate their ability to address fraud in the sober living
industry, specifically.84
A. The Federal Government’s Implementation of the “Ensuring Access to
Quality Sober Living” SUPPORT Act Provision Identifies but Does Little
to Solve the Industry’s Problems
Subtitle D, “Ensuring Access to Quality Sober Living,” imposes two duties
upon HHS.85 First, HHS must establish best practices for the operation of sober
living homes.86 The Act further states this may include “model laws for
implementing suggested minimum standards” and that the Secretary of HHS
shall consult with a variety of outside stakeholders as appropriate.87 The Act

patients-and-communities-act-(h.r.-6) (last visited Sept. 2, 2021). A majority of the Act’s provisions apply to
SUD generally. See SUPPORT Act, Pub. L. No. 115–271, 132 Stat. 3894 (2018).
80
ELAYNE J. HEISLER & JOHNATHAN H. DUFF, PUBLIC HEALTH AND OTHER RELATED PROVISIONS IN P.L
115–271, THE SUPPORT FOR PATIENTS AND COMMUNITIES ACT (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45423.
pdf.
81
Id. The Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114–255, 130 Stat. 1013 (2018), primarily “focused on medical
innovation,” and the CARA Act, Pub. L. No. 114–198, 130 Stat. 695 (2016), targeted SUD issues through broad
public health and law enforcement measures. Id.
82
Diep, supra note 43.
83
SUPPORT Act § 7031 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 290ee–5).
84
Id. §§ 8021–8023 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(d)); id. § 8122 “Eliminating Kickbacks in
Recovery Act” (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 220).
85
Id. § 7031 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 290ee–5).
86
National Recovery Housing Best Practices, 42 U.S.C.A. § 290ee–5(a)(1). The Act does not further
elaborate upon the meaning of “best practices.” See id.
87
Id. § 290ee–5(a)(1)–(b)(1).
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explicitly lists a variety of such stakeholders, including federal and state
agencies, non-governmental entities, and individuals.88 Second, HHS must
identify or facilitate “development of common indicators that could be used to
identify potentially fraudulent recovery housing operators” in collaboration with
outside stakeholders.89 HHS must also keep in mind how these common
indicators can actually prove useful to law enforcement, insurers, individuals
with SUD, and the public as a whole in identifying bad players.90 In codifying
this provision, HHS delegated both of these duties to SAMHSA.91
HHS and SAMHSA’s measures fail to help states and other stakeholders
ensure access to quality sober living homes. In 2019, SAMHSA endeavored to
carry out its SUPPORT Act duties by publishing a ten-page document proposing
“best practices and suggested guidelines” for recovery housing facilities.92
SAMHSA’s guidelines are wanting in many respects. First, despite SAMHSA’s
statutory directive to identify best practices, the document provides little
substantive guidance on the operation of effective sober living homes.93 It
provides a brief description of the different levels of care found in sober living
homes as identified by the National Alliance of Recovery Residences (NARR),
but fails to reference any specific operating policies or procedures.94 The
guidelines instead focus on big-picture principles such as respect for all beliefs,
races, and cultures, and ensuring operators recognize SUD patients often have
co-occurring mental disorders.95 The National Council for Behavioral Health
(NCBH), NARR, and other industry stakeholders criticized SAMHSA for
neglecting to collaborate with NARR constituents and excluding the detailed
standards for operating procedures published by NARR.96

88

Id. § 290ee–5(a)(2)(A)–(D).
Id. at (b)(1).
90
Id. at (b)(3)(A).
91
§ 290ee–5 is under Public Health and Welfare Code’s subchapter III–A, which codifies the duties of
SAMHSA. See id.
92
See SAMHSA, supra note 42.
93
42 U.S.C.A § 290ee–5(a); see Memorandum from David Sheridan, NARR President to the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Servs. Admin, Comments on draft, “Recovery Housing: Best Practices and Suggested
Minimum Guidelines,” (Apr. 12, 2019), https://narronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/SAMHSA-proposedrecovery-housing-guidelines-NARR-response.pdf (implying SAMHSA has misconstrued its SUPPORT Act
directives).
94
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 42, at 2–3 (citing NARR).
95
Id. at 4, 8; Diep, supra note 43.
96
Memorandum from the Nat’l Council Behav. Health to the Honorable Elinore McCance-Katz,
Assistant Sec’y for Mental Health and Substance Abuse, Recovery Housing Proposed Guidelines Overall
Comments (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.thenationalcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/NationalCouncil_Recovery-Housing-Proposed-Guidelines_Overall-Comments_4.12.2019.pdf?daf=375ateTbd56;
Sheridan, supra note 93, at 3.
89
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Stakeholders also objected to SAMHSA’s use of stigmatizing language and
pejorative tone when discussing individuals with SUD.97 Moreover, SAMHSA
attempted to provide a catch-all guide for a diverse range of audiences without
clarifying upon which audience a given responsibility should fall.98 In trying to
reach insurers, sober living home operators, law enforcement, state legislatures,
and regulatory agencies all at once, expectations for how each stakeholder
should implement SAMHSA’s principles are unclear, and concepts familiar to
one audience are confusing to another.99
Instead of offering guidance on how states can eliminate problems of fraud
in the sober living industry, SAMHSA simply identifies what these problems
are. The guidelines provide a basic, one-paragraph definition of patient
brokering, followed by instruction that “[r]ecovery house operators should be
well aware of the existence of these types of practices and should understand
[they] are unacceptable and unethical practices.”100 Although SAMHSA
explains that bad players abuse urinalysis testing by “excessive[ly]” drug testing
and charging “over and above the standard costs for lab tests,” it does not
elaborate on how much testing is excessive or when a laboratory bill is unusually
high.101 Rather than helping states and law enforcement crack down on unethical
sober living homes, SAMHSA merely directs ethical sober living operators to
be aware of something they already know is threatening their industry. Lastly,
SAMHSA advises states to “adopt a process of certification to assure program
quality” but provides no instructions for how states can do so.102 States should
at the least be provided with information on reputable certifying organizations
and accrediting bodies. All in all, HHS and SAMHSA have failed to adequately
realize their SUPPORT Act duties.
B. The Bulk of the Sober Living Industry’s Bad Players Fall Outside the
Scope of the FTC’s SUPPORT Act Authority
Subtitle B of the SUPPORT ACT, the “Opioid Addiction Recovery Fraud
Prevention Act of 2018,” enacts civil penalties for unfair or deceptive acts by
97
Nat’l Council Behav. Health, Recovery Housing Proposed Guidelines Overall Comments, supra note
96; Sheridan, supra note 93; Diep, supra note 43.
98
For example, the guidelines consistently use the pejorative term “addict” to refer to SUD patients and
provides a sensationalized depiction of SUD as a “lifestyle” filled with networks of dealers on corners, rather
than a recognized brain disease. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 42, at 2–4;
see Nat’l Council Behav. Health, Recovery Housing Proposed Guidelines Overall Comments, supra note 96.
99
Sheridan, supra note 93; see SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 42.
100
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 42, at 6–7.
101
Id. at 7.
102
Id.
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SUD “treatment services” for first-time offenders and assigns its enforcement to
the FTC.103 This provision does nothing to address fraud in the sober living
industry. The Act defines SUD “treatment services” as services purporting “to
provide referrals to treatment or recovery housing.”104 Therefore, the Act has no
application to fraudulent or deceptive actions committed by an actual sober
living home. Although patient brokers sometimes pose as referral services in
online advertisements,105 this provision does not reach the in-person recruiting
tactics employed by many patient brokers.106
Subtitle J, entitled “Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act” (EKRA),
makes it a felony to knowingly and willfully pay or receive kickbacks in return
for referring a patient to a recovery home, clinical treatment facility, or
laboratory, but only if a service “is covered by a healthcare benefit program.”107
Thus, in order to fall within EKRA’s scope, a service must be covered by public
or private health insurance.108 Although EKRA may help prosecute laboratories
that bill fraudulent drug tests to a customer’s insurance,109 EKRA has no impact
on sober living homes because they are rarely covered by public or private health
insurance.110
While the three SUPPORT Act provisions discussed above are a step in the
right direction, their actual impact on fraud and abuse in the sober living industry
proves practically nonexistent.
103

SUPPORT Act, Pub. L. No. 115–271, §§ 8021–8023 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(d)).
Id. § 8022 (emphasis added).
105
Copeland, supra note 45, at 1475–76.
106
See Patient Brokering Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Gregg Harper, Rep. Mass.); What is Patient
Brokering?, supra note 67; Pacenti, supra note 69. These tactics include prowling outside twelve-step recovery
meetings, drug courts, and inpatient treatment centers, and infiltrating treatment centers themselves. Patient
Brokering Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Gregg Harper, Rep. Mass.).
107
SUPPORT Act § 8122(a)(2) “Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act” (codified at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 220).
108
18 U.S.C.A. § 220(a), (e)(3); id. § 24(b) (defining “health care benefit program” as a “public or private
plan or contract, affecting commerce, under which any medical benefit, item, or service is provided to any
individual”).
109
There has yet to be any prosecution directly based upon EKRA since the Act’s passage. A. Lee Bentley
III & Jason P. Mehta, Beyond the False Claims Act: The Government’s Untraditional Tools in Health Care
Fraud Prosecutions, 13 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. 90, 100 (2020).
110
Close, supra note 40 (citing Polcin et al., Sober Living Houses for Alcohol and Drug Dependence: 18Month Outcomes, supra note 30). EKRA has also been criticized for applying to all laboratories in general, not
just those involved with drug testing. Copeland, supra note 45, at 1498; Bentley & Mehta, supra note 109, at
100. This technically allows any laboratory that hires a sales representative, even if for ordinary, ethical
purposes, to be prosecuted. Copeland, supra note 45, at 1500–01. There are concerns that EKRA will be used
by the government in prosecutions that have nothing to do with its purpose of protecting the SUD treatment
industry. Id. at 1501. Although this concern has yet to be confirmed, it appears the DOJ may be using EKRA to
build cases against cancer and genetic testing laboratories. Bentley & Mehta, supra note 109, at 101.
104
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III. TENTH AMENDMENT OBSTACLES TO MEANINGFUL INTERVENTION
Tenth Amendment-based principles of federalism111 and the doctrine of anticommandeering112 pose obstacles to meaningful federal intervention in the sober
living industry. The Tenth Amendment dictates that powers not specifically
delegated to the federal government by the Constitution are reserved to the
states.113 The Amendment affords states chief authority to regulate the health,
safety, and general welfare of their populations, collectively known as a state’s
“police powers.”114 Authority to regulate in the health care sector, including
authority to enact accreditation requirements and mandatory operating
standards, has historically belonged to states as a function of their police
powers.115 Accordingly, a federal law requiring minimum standards and
accreditation for the operation of sober living homes faces Tenth Amendmentbased obstacles.
This Part addresses two imminent obstacles. The first is a federalism-based
objection that, absent a compelling need for the federal government to step in,
intervention in the sober living industry should be left to the states out of respect
for federalism principles. This objection is disproven by three overarching
arguments for the necessity of federal involvement. However, additional Tenth
Amendment obstacles under the doctrine of anti-commandeering prohibit the
federal government from compelling states to regulate the sober living industry.
Therefore, the only possible path by which Congress can regulate the industry
without violating anti-commandeering principles is through the Commerce
Clause, as elaborated in Part IV.116
111
Generally, federalism principles recognize the “states and the federal government . . . as dual
sovereigns, constraining the federal government from exerting federal power in areas that the Constitution
reserves to the states.” Federalism and Powers Reserved to States, 16A AM. JURIS. 2D CONST. L. § 214 (first
citing Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011); then citing United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.
2007)).
112
The doctrine of anti-commandeering “prohibits the federal government from compelling the states to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” Basic Rule of Noninterference Between State and Federal
Governments: Anticommandeering Principle, 16A AM. JURIS. 2D CONST. L. § 224 (citing State v. Dep’t Just.,
951 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020)).
113
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”).
114
H. Benjamin Harvey & Pari V. Pandharipande, The Federal Government’s Oversight of CT Safety:
Regulatory Possibilities, 262 RADIOLOGY 391, 392 (2012).
115
Id.
116
See James Buchwalter, Lonnie E. Griffith, Jr., Janice Holben, Stephen Lease, Jeffrey J. Shampo, &
Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Federal Action Not Invading State Powers, 81 C.J.S. STATES § 57 (2020) (federal action
“within the states which are valid under the commerce power cannot be an invasion of the sovereignty of the
states in violation of the Tenth Amendment”) (first citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc.,
452 U.S. 264 (1981); then citing Mont. Caregivers Ass’n v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Mont.
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A. Federal vs. Solely State-Based Intervention Objections
A possible federalism-based objection to federal intervention in the sober
living industry is that federal involvement “would prevent states from acting as
laboratories of experimentation and developing their own requirements for”
SUD treatment “because it would standardize care.”117 This objection derives
from the theory that our federalism system of government works best “when the
federal government steps out of the way” and allows states to experiment with
“diverse approaches to addressing social problems.”118 Arguments surrounding
the role of states as laboratories in the health care sector arose in the early 1990’s
in response to conflict between state health care reform attempts and the Federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act.119 Supporters of the position that
health care regulation should be the exclusive subject of state laboratories
contend that examples of differing yet independently successful state reforms in
retirement health care coverage demonstrated the utility of experimentation.120
Three overarching arguments prove regulation of the sober living industry
cannot be left solely to states as laboratories. First, there is a deficiency of
meaningful and varied state approaches to regulation. Second, allowing states to
freely experiment with regulation has resulted in an “exodus of bad players”
from states that have cracked down on oversight in their sober living industries
to new, vulnerable states.121 Third, even if all states were to hypothetically
implement bolstered regulation, successful intervention in the sober living
industry nevertheless necessitates the institutionalization of nationwide, uniform
standards of quality and transparency, which only the federal government can
supply.
2012), aff’d, 526 F. App’x 756 (9th Cir. 2013)).
117
Cf. Copeland, supra note 45, at 1512 (citing Marina Lao, Discrediting Accreditation?: Antitrust and
Legal Education, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1035, 1076–78 (2002)) (discussing this objection in the context of national
accreditation of residential SUD treatment centers). The “state laboratory” concept originated from Justice
Brandeis’ 1932 dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. There, Justice Brandeis advanced that a
benefit of the United States’ system of government derives from the ability of individual states to experiment
with novel approaches to social problems. While states possess the ability to experiment, the Court retains power
to limit or prevent such experiments. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
118
Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 648 (2017).
119
29 U.S.C. § 1001; see, e.g., Angelo A. Stio II., State Government: The Laboratory for National Health
Care Reform, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 322, 324 (1994); Fernando R. Laguarda, Federalism Myth: States as
Laboratories of Health Care Reform, 82 GEO. L.J. 159, 170 (1993).
120
Stio, supra note 119, at 373.
121
Tony Saavedra, Florida Prosecutor Dave Aronberg Sees Parallels in Rogue Rehabs in Florida and
Southern California, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Mar. 27, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2018/03/27/
florida-prosecutor-dave-aronberg-sees-parallels-in-rogue-rehabs-in-florida-and-southern-california/ (interviewing
Dave Aronberg).
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1. Absence of Variance in State Approaches and Lack of State Approaches
Overall
The present lack of state intervention serves as an initial indicator that the
federal government must act to fill in the gaps. Despite widespread recognition
of the sober living industry’s problems, an overwhelming majority of states have
not intervened.122 Therefore, there are no examples of differing yet
independently successful state approaches to eradicating bad players.123 Florida,
the leading and perhaps only state to successfully crack down on bad players,
has advocated for urgent adoption of its same approach by other states,124
nationalization of standards, and federal intervention.125 As of January 2020,
only six states have licensure requirements for sober living homes.126 Arizona,
Hawaii, Maryland, Utah, and Wyoming require licensing for all sober living
homes, and Arkansas requires licensing of sober living homes only if they
provide post-prison housing.127 Twenty-seven states encourage sober living
homes to seek certification from a third-party non-profit organization, and one
state, Maine, requires third-party certification.128
Industry leaders suggest the absence of state regulation may be attributable
in part to the fact that, historically, states did not view SUD care as part of the
health care system.129 Until the 1970s, SUDs were viewed “as social problems,
best managed at the individual,” family, and faith-based levels.130 Although the
DSM-II declared SUD a medical disorder in 1965,131 the Surgeon General
122
Only six of the fifty states require some form of licensure, accreditation, or other certification to operate
a sober living home. Martin et al., supra note 18, at 5–6; see infra notes 124–128 and accompanying text.
123
Cf. supra note 120 and accompanying text (suggesting that examples of differing yet independently
successful state reforms in health care demonstrate the utility of experimentation).
124
Florida State Attorney Dave Aronberg, who heads Florida’s Sober Homes Task Force and considered
a “national expert” on SUD care fraud, is credited with responsibility for Florida’s anti-brokering statute, as well
as playing a major role in the three SUPPORT ACT provisions that address the sober living industry, discussed
in supra Section II. See Saavedra, supra note 121; How to Fix the Florida Shuffle, FIX THE FLA. SHUFFLE,
https://www.fixthefloridashuffle.com/issues (last visited Sept. 2, 2020). Aronberg has counseled states seeing
an influx of bad players to enact legislation and policies similar to Florida’s while they await hopeful federal
intervention. See id.
125
See Saavedra, supra note 121; How to Fix the Florida Shuffle, supra note 124; Patient Brokering
Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Dave Aronberg, State Att’y, Fla.) (“[Florida is] offering our assistance to
jurisdictions throughout the country . . . but local and state law enforcement cannot solve this problem alone.
We need the federal government to fix federal laws and regulations . . . .”).
126
Martin et al., supra note 18, at 5–6.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 5–6, 22.
129
Diep, supra note 43.
130
HHS, supra note 24, at ch. 1, at 19.
131
Sean M. Robinson & Bryan Adinoff, The Classification of Substance Use Disorders: Historical,
Contextual, and Conceptual Considerations, 6 BEHAV. SCI. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 18, 29 (2016).
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reported in 2016 that virtually all of the SUD treatment system remained
separate from mainstream health care at the financial, administrative, regulatory,
cultural, and organizational levels until as recently as the last decade.132 Ongoing
integration of the SUD treatment and general health care systems only began
taking shape following enactment of the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) and the
ACA in 2010.133 The MHPAEA restricted group health plans and insurers from
imposing less favorable limitations on SUD benefits than those imposed on
medical and surgical benefits.134 The ACA then expanded MHPAEA
requirements to individual insurance providers.135 Sober living homes, however,
do not fall within the ACA’s mandated insurance requirements.136
Notwithstanding how the MHPAEA and ACA signify progress in the integration
of the SUD and general health care systems, the sober living industry continues
to lag behind.
In sum, not only is there no diversity of state experimentation in regulating
the sober living industry, but also most states have yet to experiment at all. The
state laboratory objection therefore has no merit in context of sober living
industry regulation.137
2. Allowing States to Freely Experiment Has Spawned an Exodus of Bad
Players
The “exodus of bad players” that takes place after a state cracks down on
sober living home regulation evidences that solely state-based regulation can
only disperse, not dispel, bad players.138 If a state or local government enacts
legislation that threatens to, or actually does, shut down bad player-owned sober
living homes, bad players will simply leave that state and open a new facility in
a state with weaker oversight.139 These new states may be unaware of and

132

HHS, supra note 24, at ch. 1, at 19.
42 U.S.C.A. § 18022; Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343, §§ 511, 512, 122 Stat. 3765, 3881; see HHS, supra note 26, at ch. 1, at 20
(identifying MHPAEA and ACA’s enactments as when “[t]he longstanding separation of substance use disorders
from the rest of health care began to change”).
134
Pub. L. No. 110–343, §§ 511, 512(a)(1)(3)(A), 122 Stat. 3765, 3881.
135
42 U.S.C.A. § 18022.
136
Id.; Close, supra note 40.
137
Cf. Stio, supra note 119, at 373 (arguing the many, diverse, and successful state approaches to health
insurance reforms justify a state laboratory approach).
138
Saavedra, supra note 121 (interviewing Dave Aronberg).
139
Julia Lurie, “Mom, When They Look at Me, They See Dollar Signs”, MOTHER JONES (Mar.–Apr. 2019),
https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2019/02/opioid-epidemic-rehab-recruiters/.
133
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unprepared for an unscrupulous operator’s bad practices.140 Bad players may
change a facility’s name, switch to a new laboratory to cash out on urinalysis
drug testing, or employ other measures to shield themselves from oversight.141
Therefore, only intervention at the federal level can disrupt this pattern of
unethical sober living home owners keeping their schemes alive by moving from
state to state.142
While it is possible that such “new” states may eventually catch up to an
influx of bad players and “serve as . . . laborator[ies]”143 for novel regulatory
measures, we cannot afford to wait. The consequences of bad players’ actions
can be a matter of life and death. An estimated average of 501 individuals die
from SUD every day in the United States.144 At best, SUD patients in bad playerowned sober living homes miss out on the adequate care, support, and relapse
prevention tools they could receive from an ethical sober living. At worst, bad
players provide vulnerable SUD patients with drugs and their relapse to keep
patients trapped in the profitable cycle of addiction.145 Moreover, the lag
between the arrival of bad players in a new state and the new state’s regulatory
response gives bad players time to create and perfect new fraudulent tactics.
States that exhibit success in cracking down on bad players, such as Florida, not
only readily demonstrate promising models of intervention, but also actively
beseech the federal government to intervene.146 In short, there is no time for
states to experiment in the midst of a nationwide SUD crisis.147

140
See, e.g., What is the Florida Shuffle?, supra note 52 (expressing concern that success of Florida’s
Sober Homes Task Force is sending bad players to other states); Christine Vestal, Opioid Treatment Scam May
Be Coming to Your State, STATELINE (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/
stateline/2019/10/07/opioid-treatment-scam-may-be-coming-to-your-state.
141
Lurie, supra note 139.
142
See Copeland, supra note 45, at 1512.
143
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
144
This average is based on the combination of provisional reported drug overdoses over a 12-month
period ending in January 2021 and yearly average of deaths attributable to alcoholism, a subclassification of
SUD not reported in overdose deaths. CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 2 (estimating 94,134
Americans fatally overdosed in 2020); NAT’L CTR. DRUG ABUSE STAT., supra note 3 (reporting an average of
88,000 deaths per year are attributable to alcoholism).
145
See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text for discussion of how bad players collaborate with
unethical inpatient treatments providers.
146
See, e.g., What is the Florida Shuffle?, supra note 52 (“Local and state law enforcement cannot solve
this problem alone. This is a national crisis that deserves a federal response. Together, we can and will convince
the federal government to [intervene].”).
147
Cf. Copeland, supra note 45, at 1512 (arguing that state laboratory objections to national accreditation
requirements for residential treatment carry “less weight in the face of a nationwide opioid crisis”).
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3. Even if All States Attempted to Strengthen Sober Living Industry
Oversight, Uniform Nationwide Measures Are Nevertheless Necessary
for Achieving Meaningful Intervention
Objections to federal, in lieu of solely state-based, intervention in the sober
living industry prove inviable when considering the nationwide parameters of
the industry’s issues and the inability of states to confront these issues alone.
Meaningful intervention in the sober living industry necessitates the
institutionalization of nationwide, uniform standards of quality and
transparency, which only the federal government can provide. This necessity
exists for two reasons. First, because there are no common industry standards,
there is no way for SUD patients to evaluate and compare the quality of sober
living homes. This creates an environment where bad players can thrive. Second,
the sober living industry has an unusually mobile character because residents
frequently travel to out-of-state facilities. A reliable mechanism for evaluating
quality and transparency must function at a nationwide level.
Without a set of nationwide, uniform standards for quality and transparency,
there is no way for prospective sober living home residents to reliably evaluate
and compare different facilities. At present, there is no common basis for
assessing the quality and effectiveness of even ethical sober living homes.148 It
is an industry norm for SUD providers to offer minimal objective data on the
“success” and quality of their programs.149 Additionally, even if a facility
wanted to provide such information, there is no recognized standard against
which to reference their services.150 This lack of industry uniformity is a major
reason why the sober living industry is an environment where bad players can
thrive. Because there is no feasible mechanism for SUD patients to gauge quality
of service, there is in turn no incentive for bad players to provide quality
services.151 Moreover, because even legitimate sober living home operators are
not expected to provide potential residents with evidence to support their
facility’s quality, it is easy for bad players to mislead potential customers
without raising any red flags.152 In the eyes of potential residents, the ethical
148
See NARR, AN INTRODUCTION AND MEMBERSHIP INVITATION TO THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
RECOVERY RESIDENCES 9 (2011), https://narronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/NARR-White-Paper-111006final.pdf.
149
Copeland, supra note 45, at 1490 (citing Teri Sforza, Tony Saavedra, Scott Schwebke, Lori Basheda,
Mindy Schauer, Jeff Gritchen, & Ian Wheeler, How Some Southern California Drug Rehab Centers Exploit
Addiction, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (May 21, 2017, 5:55 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/21/how-somesouthern-california-drug-rehab-centers-exploit-addiction/).
150
Id. (citing Teri Sforza et al., supra note 149).
151
Id. at 1491 (citation omitted).
152
Id.
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sober living home on one side of town looks the same as the unethical sober
living home on the other.
The unique nature of the industry’s consumers, newly sober SUD patients,
further confounds the consequences of this lack of uniform standards. There is
little chance an individual with SUD who is brand new to recovery, physically
and mentally vulnerable, and lacking recovery capital can accurately judge the
quality of SUD care during or even after they receive it.153 Additionally,
federalized standards are necessary because at present, no uniform terminology
exists to describe practices across the industry.154 This lack of common language
within the industry itself contributes to the misunderstood, confused efforts to
create a cross-regional framework for ethical providers to communicate and
collaborate on critical issues.155
The second major reason necessitating federal intervention is the mobile
character of the SUD treatment industry. Unlike typical health care patients,
SUD patients frequently travel out-of-state for treatment.156 Because so many
sober living home residents, often lured by brokers, travel to other states, there
must be a reliable mechanism to provide transparency of quality at a nationwide
level.157 This cross-state mobility makes the SUD industry’s issues a national
problem.158 Organizations of SUD professionals have stressed the unique
pressures of the industry’s mobile character in making pleas for federal
standards.159 In 2019, the Association for Addiction Professionals released a
statement “urg[ing] Congress to work with” itself and other industry
stakeholders to create national credentials and standards to account for the crossstate mobility of individuals seeking recovery services.160 The Association
asserted that variation among state licensing and credentialing requirements
functions “as a barrier to entry, advancement, and retention” of workers that play
a critical role in addressing the nation’s SUD crisis.161
153
See id. at 1490–91. A SUD patient lacks the expertise to determine whether, or to what degree, a relapse
resulted from inadequate care or from their own insufficient engagement with the services provided. See id.
154
NARR, supra note 148, at 9–10.
155
Id.
156
Copeland, supra note 45, at 1506.
157
Patient Brokering Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Eric Gold, Chief, Mass. Att’y Gen. Health
Care Div.).
158
Id. (statement of Eric Gold, Chief, Mass. Att’y Gen. Health Care Div.).
159
ASSOC. ADDICTION PRO., ADDICTION PROFESSIONAL CREDENTIALING: THE NEED FOR NATIONAL
STANDARDS (2019), https://www.naadac.org/assets/2416/2019-aina-addiction-professional-credentialing-needfor-national-standards.pdf. The statement called for national standards across the SUD continuum of care,
including sober living homes. Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
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The above concerns demonstrate that even if all states experimented with
regulating sober living homes, state efforts alone would not be sufficient to
address the industry’s problems. The need for nationalized standards of quality
and transparency can only be met by federal intervention.
B. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine of the Tenth Amendment
Although the federalism-based objections discussed above are unfounded,
federal intervention in the sober living industry remains severely limited by the
doctrine of anti-commandeering. A product of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
doctrine of anti-commandeering asserts that because the Tenth Amendment
prescribes separation of powers, the federal government cannot “commandeer”
state powers by forcing state governments to enact federal laws.162 Under the
anti-commandeering principles in New York v. United States and Murphy v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association, the federal government cannot compel
state governments to legislate or regulate in the sober living industry in
accordance with federal directives without the authority of a constitutionally
enumerated federal power.163 Under South Dakota v. Dole, the federal
government can avoid anti-commandeering violations by attaching conditions
to a state’s receipt of federal funds, but this avenue proves futile in the context
of the sober living industry because sober living homes are rarely entwined with
federal dollars.164
1. Anti-Commandeering Limits: New York and Murphy
Under New York, Congress cannot regulate the sober living industry absent
authority from one of its constitutionally enumerated powers.165 Anticommandeering principles prevent Congress from compelling states to
administer a federal regulatory scheme or enact legislation to establish
nationalized minimum standards in the sober living industry.166 In New York, the
Court invalidated a provision of a federal law that required states to carry out a

162
Caleb Seckman, Anti-Commandeering: A Modern Doctrine for a Modern World, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 150, 152 (2019) (first citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter,
ed., 1961); then citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).
163
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018) (holding Congress cannot
commandeer state legislatures); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding “[t]he Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program”).
164
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
165
New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
166
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477 (holding Congress cannot commandeer state legislatures); New York, 505
U.S. at 188 (holding “the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program”).

GREENBERG_10.5.21

2021]

10/5/2021 10:24 AM

BLIND SPOT IN PLAIN SIGHT

133

federal regulatory scheme for the disposal of nuclear waste.167 The law required
state governments to either enact legislation that conformed with federal
instructions for regulating disposal of low-level nuclear waste or, alternatively,
take possession of all nuclear waste in their state.168 The provision did not
provide states an option to decline administering the federal guidelines.169 The
Court explained that while Congress could have achieved its regulatory intent if
it enacted the waste provision under the authority of a constitutionally
enumerated congressional power, Congress could not simply commandeer a
state’s police powers by forcing it to regulate.170
The Court has consistently applied its holding in New York in cases where a
federal regulatory scheme clashes with anti-commandeering principles. In Printz
v. United States, the Court held that Congress cannot side-step state police
powers by compelling state officials and local governments to administer a
federal regulatory scheme.171 In the recent case of Murphy v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association, the Court invoked its precedent from New York in holding
that the federal government cannot force states to enact or refrain from enacting
legislation to achieve federal regulatory interests.172
Although intervention in the sober living industry must take place on a
nationwide level to have a meaningful impact, anti-commandeering
jurisprudence makes clear that “[n]o matter how powerful” or urgent a federal
interest may be, “the Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority
to require the states to regulate.”173
2. Loopholes: Surviving Dole Still Fails to Reach the Sober Living Industry
Because sober living homes rarely take insurance, Congress cannot utilize
the Taxing and Spending Clause “loophole” in the anti-commandeering doctrine
to achieve meaningful federal intervention. Found in Article I of the U.S.
Constitution, the Taxing and Spending Clause authorizes Congress to spend
federal funds in pursuit of the “[g]eneral [w]elfare of the United States.”174
Under Dole, Congress’s spending power authorizes it to incentivize states to
carry out a federal regulatory scheme by attaching “conditions on the receipt of
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

New York, 505 U.S. at 153–54, 188 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(e)(d)(2)(c)).
Id. at 153–54 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(e)(d)(2)(c)).
Id. at 177.
Id.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018).
New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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federal funds,” provided the condition is “in pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’”175
The Court in Dole upheld a federal law that withheld a percentage of a state’s
federal highway funding if a state declined to raise its legal drinking age to
twenty-one.176 The Court reasoned Congress could incentivize states to carry out
the federal regulatory interest because the purpose of Congress’s regulatory
scheme—addressing the dangers of young people drinking and driving on
interstate highways—furthered the nation’s general welfare.177 Additionally, the
condition on the highway funds was sufficiently related to the dangers of drunk
drivers on highways.178
The federal government has had success regulating within state health care
sectors via its spending powers by attaching conditions on the receipt of
Medicare funds.179 Such regulations differ from the highway condition in Dole
in that instead of applying to states, these regulations apply to private medical
providers that receive Medicare funding or take Medicare payments from
clients.180 This provides an indirect route for the federal government to regulate
in the health care sector without having to compel state governments to carry
out federal goals. Fraud and abuse in the sober living industry could likely be
considered a threat to the general welfare, like the dangers of drunk driving were
in Dole.181 However, Congress cannot use this loophole to regulate the sober
living industry because sober living homes rarely take Medicare or other
government provided insurance.182
Although federal, rather than solely state-based, intervention is crucial to
eliminating bad players from the sober living industry, Tenth Amendment
concerns severely shrink the federal government’s options for regulating the
industry within the bounds of its constitutional authority.

175

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987).
Id. at 205 (citing 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1982 ed., Supp. III)).
177
Id. at 208.
178
Id.
179
Harvey & Pandharipande, supra note 114, at 393 (first citing CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE LONG-TERM
BUDGET OUTLOOK (2010); then citing Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(2006)).
180
Id. (first citing CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 179; then citing Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006)).
181
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
182
Close, supra note 40 (citing Douglas Polcin et al., Sober Living Houses for Alcohol and Drug
Dependence: 18-Month Outcomes, supra note 30).
176
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IV. A FEDERALISM-FRIENDLY SOLUTION FOR MEANINGFUL FEDERAL
INTERVENTION: MANDATORY ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS PURSUANT TO
CONGRESS’S COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER
This Part asserts that (1) meaningful, Tenth Amendment friendly federal
intervention can be achieved by enactment of a federal law that sets minimum
quality standards and accreditation requirements for operating a sober living
home; and (2) such legislation would have proper constitutional authority under
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, and thus would not violate the
federalism-based concerns described in Part III. Federal regulation of the
operation of a sober living home meets the necessary requirements to qualify as
an exercise of congressional Commerce Clause powers under Supreme Court
jurisprudence. This contention is supported by analysis of six major decisions in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.183 This Part concludes by showing that support
for the constitutionality of federal regulation of sober living homes is more than
theoretical. One of the few federal laws regulating intrastate aspects of the health
care sector is the Mammography Quality Standards Act (MQSA), which sets
minimum accreditation requirements for the operation of a mammography
screening center, the same measures for federal intervention proposed by this
Comment. The MQSA was enacted pursuant to Congress’s commerce powers
to remedy issues strikingly similar to those affecting the sober living industry.
A. Congress’s Commerce Clause Power in General
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate [c]ommerce
with foreign [n]ations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes.”184 The Court first broached the meaning of the Commerce Clause in
Gibbons v. Ogden.185 There, Justice Marshall clarified the meaning of
“commerce” as stretching beyond literal traffic to “the commercial intercourse
between nations, and parts of nations” and vesting in Congress the authority to
prescribe the rules by which such intercourse may be carried out.186 Subsequent
decisions made clear Congress may exercise its Commerce Clause power to
regulate incidents of interstate commerce in areas traditionally regulated under

183
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
184
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
185
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)) (identifying Gibbons as where the
Court “first defined the nature of Congress’s commerce power”).
186
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189–90, 196.
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an individual state’s police powers.187 The Commerce Clause serves as a
recurrent basis for the constitutionality of federal legislation and provides one of
the broadest authorities for congressional exercise of power.188 Although the
Court’s interpretation of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce has
expanded over time, it is not unrestricted.189
In United States v. Lopez, the Court condensed its prior jurisprudence to
establish a three-part framework for determining when Congress exceeds the
scope of its Commerce Clause powers.190 For a federal law regulating interstate
commerce to be upheld as a constitutional exercise of congressional commerce
powers, it must fall within at least one of three broad categories of regulatory
activity: (1) laws regulating “the use of the channels of interstate commerce”;
(2) laws “regulat[ing] and protect[ing] [the] instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce”; or (3) laws regulating
an activity that “substantially affects interstate commerce.”191
Federal regulation of the sober living industry falls into the third Lopez
category of congressional power: activities that “substantially affect interstate
commerce.”192 Regulation of sober living homes cannot fall into the first or
second Lopez categories because the operations of sober living homes are often
confined within the borders of a single state. Thus, the activity is “intrastate,”
not interstate.193 The first two Lopez categories—“channels of interstate
commerce” and instrumentalities, “persons, or things in interstate commerce”—

187
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (“It is no objection to the assertion of the power to
regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the
police power of the states.”).
188
KENNETH R. THOMAS, THE POWER TO REGULATE COMMERCE: LIMITS ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER 1–
2 (2014). Over 700 federal statutory provisions directly refer to “interstate” or “foreign” commerce in regulating
a wide range of issues, from civil rights to child pornography. Id.
189
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556–57 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968), overruled on other
grounds by Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
190
Id. at 558.
191
Id. at 558–59 (citing Darby, 312 U.S. at 113; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 256 (1964); Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); S. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 222 U.S. 20, 32 (1911); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steal, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196 n.27). The first two categories do not apply to this Comment’s
argument. Briefly explained, “channels of interstate commerce” consist of the actual interstate channels of
transportation commodities travel through, such as roads and railways. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. Regulations
that protect instrumentalities, persons, and things in interstate commerce are those that attend to safety and
accessibility of modes of interstate transportation. Thomas, supra note 188, at 8 (citing Preseault v. United States,
494 U.S. 1 (1990)).
192
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.
193
See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530, 537 (1985) (describing a
transit system operating within a state’s borders as “engaged in intrastate commercial activity”).
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necessarily require that a regulated activity is interstate in character, involving
commerce between multiple states.194
B. Congress Can Regulate the Sober Living Industry Under the Commerce
Clause Because the Operation of Sober Living Homes Constitutes an
Economic Activity that Has a Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce
Operation of a sober living home constitutes an activity that may be
regulated under the third Lopez category for two main reasons. First, operation
of a sober living home is part of a “class of activities” that have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, as demonstrated in Wickard v. Filburn, Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, Perez v. United States, and Gonzales v. Raich.195
Second, the more scrutable analysis of the limits on Congress’s commerce power
to regulate intrastate activities established in Lopez and United States v.
Morrison does not apply to the regulation of the sober living industry because
operation of a sober living home is an economic activity.196 The development of
the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, explicated below, illustrates the
requirements for when Congress may constitutionally regulate an intrastate
activity in the third Lopez category.
1. Wickard v. Filburn and the Aggregation Theory
The Court in Wickard established the initial test for whether an intrastate
activity substantially affects interstate commerce: an activity’s effect on
commerce is measured by the aggregated effect of all instances of the activity,
not the individual effect of a particular instance before a court.197 For example,
if a plaintiff who operates one vending machine was before a court, the court
would consider the combined effect of all vending machines in all states in
measuring the impact of operating a vending machine on interstate commerce.
194
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Darby, 312 U.S. at 113; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 256; Houston, 234
U.S. 342; S. Ry. Co., 222 U.S. at 32; Perez, 402 U.S. at 150).
195
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (holding “[o]ur case law firmly establishes Congress’
power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce”); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. 241; Perez,
402 U.S. 146.
196
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59; see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (clarifying that
the characterization of an activity as economic vs. non-economic was “central” to Lopez’s holding in striking
down a statute regulating non-economic activity).
197
See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–28 (holding that although an individual instance of an activity may have
a trivial impact on interstate commerce, it falls under federal regulations when its impact is “taken together with
that of many others similarly situated”); Thomas, supra note 188, at 9–10 (explaining the rationale of combining
the effects of all individual instances to find a substantial impact on interstate commerce is now recognized as
“aggregation theory”).
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In Wickard, a wheat farmer challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute
that allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to limit the amount of wheat individual
farmers could grow in a year.198 Congress enacted the statute to control the
volume of wheat “moving in interstate . . . commerce in order to avoid surpluses
and shortages.”199
The farmer argued that because his wheat production was for personal
consumption and strictly local sale, his activities did not exert the requisite
“substantial” effect on interstate commerce, and therefore Congress’s commerce
power did not apply.200 The Court rejected this argument, finding that while the
impact of farmer’s own contribution on the nationwide wheat demand “may be
trivial by itself,” his crop nonetheless fell within federal regulation because,
when “taken together with [the contributions] of many [other wheat farmers]
similarly situated” to the individual farmer, the activity’s impact was “far from
trivial.”201 The Court therefore upheld the statute as a constitutional exercise of
congressional commerce powers.202
2. Post-Wickard Jurisprudence
Post-Wickard decisions afforded Congress considerable deference in
regulating intrastate activities deemed to affect interstate commerce.203 As long
as Congress both (1) possesses a rational basis for concluding an activity
substantially affects interstate commerce and (2) selects a reasonable means for
eliminating the activity’s negative effects, a law is a constitutional exercise of
Congress’s commerce powers.204 Whether Congress possesses a rational basis
is determined by a review of the challenged law’s legislative history.205 Congress
retains considerable discretion in selecting its means for eliminating the negative
activity and whether Congress could have chosen other reasonable methods is
irrelevant to judicial scrutiny.206
198
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115–17, 119 (discussing the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 31,
codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. § 1281 et seq.).
199
Id. at 115 (first citing 26 U.S.C. § 331, then citing 7 U.S.C. § 1331).
200
Id. at 119.
201
Id. at 127–28.
202
Id. at 128–29.
203
Thomas, supra note 188, at 10 (first citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); then citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)).
204
See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258–59 (explaining “[t]he only questions are: (1) whether
Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it
had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate” in evaluating
a statute regulating intrastate activity).
205
See id. at 249, 261–62; Perez, 402 U.S. at 155–57.
206
Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261–62.
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Two post-Wickard decisions—Heart of Atlanta and Perez—demonstrate
specific intrastate activities Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause.
These cases provide analogous support for the constitutionality of federal
regulation of sober living homes.
a. Heart of Atlanta: Lodgings for Transient Guests
The Court in Heart of Atlanta upheld a federal statute regulating inns and
hotels catering to interstate guests as a permissible use of Congress’s power to
regulate an intrastate economic activity.207 The plaintiff motel challenged Title
II of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited any hotel, inn, motel, or
other establishment that “provides lodging to transient guests” from practicing
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or national origin.208 The Act stated
that any establishment offering lodging for transient guests has a “per se effect”
on interstate commerce.209 Other private establishments, such as restaurants,
only affect interstate commerce if they actually serve interstate guests or
purchase goods from other states.210
The motel claimed it was outside the scope of Congress’s power to regulate
intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce because its operation was “of
a purely local character.”211 The Court explained that even if the motel truly
exclusively serviced local guests, an intrastate activity is one where, generally,
“interstate commerce . . . feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation [is that] applies the squeeze.”212 Motels in general affect interstate
commerce, and thus whether the individual motel only affected local commerce
was irrelevant.213 The Court then proceeded through the remaining third Lopez
category requirements. First, it held Congress could have rationally concluded
intrastate incidents of discrimination by establishments lodging transient guests
substantially effected interstate commerce.214 Second, the Court deferred to
Congress’s judgment in selecting Title II as its means for addressing this
activity’s obstruction on interstate commerce.215

207

Id. at 258, 261–62.
Id. at 242–44, 247 (citing Pub. L. No. 88–53, §§ 201–207, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (prior to 1978
amendment)).
209
Id. at 247–48 (citing Pub. L. No. 88–53, §§ 201, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (prior to 1978 amendment)).
210
Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 88–53, §§ 201, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (prior to 1978 amendment)).
211
Id. at 258.
212
Id. (quoting United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfg. Ass’n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)).
213
See id. (quoting Women’s Sportswear Mfg. Ass’n, 336 U.S. at 464).
214
Id. at 258.
215
Id. at 261–62.
208
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b. Perez: Classes of Evil Activities
In Perez, the Court held that provisions of a federal statute regulating
intrastate incidences of “loan sharking” constituted “a permissible exercise” of
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.216 Loan sharks are individuals who
employ threats, violence, or other criminal means to extort repayment of a credit
extension.217 The loan shark provision raised constitutional and federalism
concerns because it “occup[ied] the field of general criminal law,” which states
traditionally regulate under their police powers.218 The only way the statute
would not violate the Tenth Amendment was if it satisfied the test of the third
Lopez category.219
The Court applied its holding from Heart of Atlanta, dubbing this standard
“the class of activities test.”220 Under this test, Congress could have rationally
determined that purely intrastate instances of loan sharking belonged to a class
of activities that, as a whole, substantially effects interstate commerce.221 The
second requirement that Congress select a reasonable means raised an additional
problem: the law would likely regulate many legitimate credit loan providers in
addition to the extortionate loan sharks it was meant to target.222 The Court
dismissed this concern, finding that “when it is necessary in order to prevent an
evil[,]” a law may regulate areas which “embrace more than the precise” evil it
intends to target.223 In other words, Congress is permitted to regulate more than
the specific, undesirable activity affecting interstate commerce if it is not
logistically possible to only regulate the targeted harmful activity.
3. Lopez and Morrison: Limits on When Congress May Regulate Intrastate
Non-Economic Activity
The expansive post-Wickard conception of the Commerce Clause power
persisted until 1995, when the Court in Lopez struck down a federal statute on
the sole grounds that it exceeded congressional commerce powers for the first
time in nearly six decades.224 Lopez and Morrison are regarded as splitting

216
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 146–47, 150 (1971) (citing Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub.
L. 90–321, § 202(a), 82 Stat. 160 (1968)).
217
Id. at 147 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 891 (Supp. V 1964)).
218
Id. at 149 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 1610 (1968) (statement of Rep. Robert Eckhardt)).
219
See id. at 152.
220
Id. at 153 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. 241).
221
Id. at 154–55.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 154 (quoting Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 259 (1927)).
224
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); Thomas, supra note 188, at 6 (citing Herman
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judicial review of a federal statute regulating in the third Lopez category into
two paths of analysis: one path for economic activities and a separate path of
heightened scrutiny for non-economic activities.225 If the activity regulated by a
statute is non-economic, then (1) a court may not aggregate the effects of all
instances of the activity in measuring whether it substantially affects interstate
commerce; and (2) Congress is afforded less deference in evaluating whether it
could have rationally concluded the activity substantially affects interstate
commerce.226 The regulated activity must exhibit a conspicuous connection to
interstate commerce for a court to find Congress’s conclusion was rational.227
Lopez struck down a statutory provision that made it a felony “for any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows,
or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”228 The Court contrasted the
firearm provision with several statutory provisions regulating intrastate
activities that had been upheld in prior cases, specifically citing its holdings in
Wickard, Heart of Atlanta, and Perez.229 The last two cases presented a clear
pattern: where an economic activity is determined by Congress to “substantially
affect[] interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained.”230 In contrast, the firearm possession statute in Lopez regulated an
activity that “by its terms” intrinsically had nothing to do with commerce or any
kind of economic operation.231 Therefore, analysis of whether Congress could
have rationally concluded that the possession of a firearm in school zones
substantially affects interstate commerce (1) required greater scrutiny, and (2)
its effect on interstate commerce could not be measured by an aggregation of all
its instances.232 The Court found that the government’s arguments for a
connection between intrastate firearm possession and interstate commerce were
too attenuated to fall within Congress’s commerce powers and struck down the
statute.233

Schwartz, Court Tries to Patrol a Political Line, LEGAL TIMES 25 (May 8, 1995)) (stating prior to Lopez, the
Court had not struck down a statute solely due to finding it exceeded the Commerce Clause since 1937).
225
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–11 (2000) (distinguishing the more complicated
analysis of a statute regulating non-economic activity from a statute regulating economic activity).
226
Mark A. Correro, The Lopez/Morrison Limitation on the Commerce Clause—Fact or Fabrication?, 14
NAT’L ITALIAN AM. BAR ASS’N L.J. 17, 18 (2006).
227
Id.
228
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551–52 (citing and quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1998)).
229
Id. at 551, 559–61 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942)).
230
Id. at 551, 560 (first citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 150; then citing Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 256).
231
Id. at 561 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1998)).
232
Id. at 561–64.
233
Id. at 567–68.
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The extent to which the Court intended Lopez to influence its Commerce
Clause doctrine in future cases remained unclear until five years later, when the
Court reaffirmed Lopez’s holding in its Morrison decision.234 There, Chief
Justice Rehnquist made clear that Lopez’s holding carried to all future
Commerce Clause analyses where an activity regulated in the third Lopez
category was non-economic.235 Rehnquist emphasized that this distinction
between economic and non-economic activity was central to the Lopez decision
and plays a crucial role in any Commerce Clause analysis.236
Uncertainties regarding whether Morrison and Lopez signaled greater
judicial restriction on the scope of Congress’s power to regulate economic
intrastate activities were put to rest in the Court’s 2005 Gonzales v. Raich
decision.237 There, the Court applied the “class of activities test” to uphold a
federal statutory provision that regulated intrastate production and
manufacturing of marijuana, including marijuana grown for personal use.238 An
individual and local instance of intrastate marijuana production belonged to an
economic “class of activities” that, when aggregated in all instances,
substantially affected interstate commerce.239 The Court clarified that the
limitations established in Lopez do not apply to economic activities, noting that
“[u]nlike those at issue in Lopez . . . , the activities regulated” by the marijuana
provision were “quintessentially economic.”240
The Court further emphasized the disparity between analyses of economic
and non-economic activities, “stress[ing] that the task before [it] is a modest
one” when assessing the scope of Congress’s authority to regulate economic
activity.241 The Court reiterated that its determination did not concern whether
the aggregate of an economic activity “substantially affects interstate commerce
in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists” for Congress to have reached
this conclusion.242 Moreover, in meeting this deferential standard of review,
234
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); David M. Crowell, Gonzales v. Raich and the
Development of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: Is the Necessary and Proper Clause the Perfect Drug, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 251, 273–76 (2006). The Morrison Court struck down a statutory provision that created a federal
civil rights remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional
commerce powers. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601–02 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981).
235
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551–60 (1995)).
236
Id. at 610–12 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551).
237
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2006); see Crowell, supra note 234, at 283.
238
Raich, 545 U.S. at 7–9 (citing 21 U.S.C.A. § 801).
239
Id. at 17, 19–20 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971)).
240
Id. at 25 (first referencing Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; then citing Morrison, 529 U.S. 598).
241
Id. at 22.
242
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276–80 (1981); Perez, 402 U.S. at 155–56; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
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Congress is not required to procure any particularized findings to conclude an
economic activity sufficiently affects interstate commerce and is never expected
“to legislate with scientific exactitude.”243
4. Federal Regulation of Sober Living Homes Satisfies the Supreme
Court’s Requirements for Regulating Intrastate Activity Under
Congress’s Commerce Clause Powers
Sober living homes may be regulated in the third Lopez category because (1)
they constitute an economic, as opposed to a non-economic, activity; (2)
Congress can rationally conclude that operating a sober living home belongs to
a class of activities that, when aggregated in all instances, substantially affects
interstate commerce;244 and (3) although a law setting minimum standards and
accreditation requirements would regulate legitimate sober living homes in
addition to those run by bad players, it nevertheless constitutes a reasonable
method for eliminating the negative effects of the sober living industry on
interstate commerce.245
a. Operation of a Sober Living Home Is Not Limited by Lopez and
Morrison Because It Is an Economic Activity
As confirmed by the Court in Raich, limitations on Congress’s power to
regulate intrastate activities under Lopez do not apply to economic activities.246
The operation of a sober living home clearly constitutes an activity of an
economic nature. The Court in Lopez distinguished the firearm provision statute
from the statutes in Heart of Atlanta and Perez because possessing a firearm “by
its terms” did not intrinsically involve any economic or commercial
enterprise.247 Unlike the activity in Lopez, the operation of a sober living home
plainly involves economic enterprise because sober living homes provide a
service to residents for a monetary fee, whether paid privately or through a
resident’s insurance coverage.248 Moreover, a federal law regulating sober living
294, 299–301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States 379 U.S. 241, 251–53 (1964)).
243
Id. at 17, 21 (first citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562; then citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 156). The Court did state
that Congress might need to present particularized findings when a regulation implicates a special constitutional
concern, such as interference with the right to free speech. Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 664–68 (1994) (plurality opinion)).
244
Perez, 402 U.S. at 153–55 (citing Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. 241).
245
Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258–59 (requiring the means Congress selects to eliminate the negative
effects of an activity be reasonable).
246
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25.
247
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1998)).
248
Close, supra note 40 (citing Douglas Polcin et al., Sober Living Houses for Alcohol and Drug
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homes would be similar to the statute in Heart of Atlanta.249 The statute there
regulated “any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging
to transient guests.”250 Similar to the former establishments, providing
individuals with temporary lodging is arguably the most basic characteristic
shared by all sober living homes, including facilities run by bad players.251
Because sober living homes constitute an economic activity, the next step in
this analysis turns on whether Congress could rationally determine that the
operation of a sober living home substantially affects interstate commerce. As
shown below, Congress can rationally make this determination.
b. Congress Can Satisfy a Rational Basis Review of the Conclusion that
Operating a Sober Living Home Belongs to a Class of Activities that,
When Aggregated in All Instances, Substantially Affects Interstate
Commerce
A court should find Congress could have rationally concluded that the
operation of sober living homes substantially affects interstate commerce. A
court’s analysis turns on whether a rational basis could have existed for
Congress’s conclusion, not on whether a rational basis exists in fact.252
Furthermore, Congress may aggregate the combined effects of all sober living
homes in the nation in measuring their effect on interstate commerce.253 Lastly,
Congress is not required to make findings of a connection between sober living
homes and interstate commerce with exactitude to reach this conclusion.254
As an initial matter, even without aggregating the combined effects of all
sober living homes on interstate commerce, the industry in general possesses an
interstate character. Sober living home residents frequently travel to out-of-state

Dependence: 18-Month Outcomes, supra note 30).
249
Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 247 (referencing Pub. L. No. 88–53, §§ 201–207, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)
(prior to 1978 amendment)).
250
Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 88–53, § 201(b)(1), 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (prior to 1978 amendment)).
251
See, e.g., NAT’L INST. DRUG ABUSE, supra note 12 (defining recovery housing as “short-term housing
for patients, often following other types of inpatient or residential treatment”); NARR, supra note 10, at 5;
Patient Brokering Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Gregg Harper, Rep. Mass.) (explaining that bad player
sober living homes profit from the fees residents pay to stay in their facilities, regardless of whether they provide
any recovery supporting services).
252
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2006) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 557 (1995)) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276–80 (1981); Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155–56 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 249, 299–301 (1964); Heart
of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 251–53).
253
See id. at 17–20 (reiterating Congress may aggregate effects of all instances of an economic activity).
254
Id. at 17.
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facilities.255 While in some instances this is directly due to patient brokers luring
residents to other states, SUD treatment as a whole is a markedly mobile
industry.256 The exodus of bad players to new states, discussed in Part III, further
demonstrates the interstate nature of the sober living industry.257 Bad players
who once operated sober living homes in states that have cracked down on
industry fraud are now moving their operations across state lines.258
Still, these general characterizations of the industry as one that brings in
customers from other states, standing alone, could fail to provide a rational basis
for the law proposed by this Comment because there are no black and white
statistics to support these characterizations. To date, there has never been a
“systematic inventory of [sober living homes] in the United States,” a
shortcoming that ironically is considered a result of the industry’s lack of
government oversight.259 Because the number of sober living homes in the
United States remains unknown, there is no way to verify the perceived
frequency of individuals crossing state-lines to live in them.260 Although
Supreme Court precedent does not require Congress to present particularized
findings in order to satisfy a rational basis review, this objection should be
noted.261
However, Congress could nevertheless rationally conclude that the operation
of a sober living home affects interstate commerce by aggregating the effects of
all its instances. Like the motel that claimed it operated on a solely local basis in
Heart of Atlanta, an individual sober living home, even if it exclusively services
local customers, nonetheless belongs to a class of activities where “interstate
commerce . . . feels the pinch.”262 As previously noted, SUD costs the national
economy an estimated average of $520.5 billion each year.263 The impact of poor

255
Copeland, supra note 45, at 1505–06; Patient Brokering Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Gregg
Harper, Rep. Mass.).
256
Copeland, supra note 45, at 1505–06; Patient Brokering Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Gregg
Harper, Rep. Mass.).
257
See supra Part III.A.2.
258
Saavedra, supra note 121 (interviewing Dave Aronberg); see What is the Florida Shuffle?, supra note
52 (expressing concern that success of Florida’s Sober Homes Task Force is sending bad players to other states);
Vestal, supra note 140.
259
NARR, supra note 10, at 9.
260
See id.
261
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 21 (2006) (first citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995);
then citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971)).
262
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (quoting United States v.
Women’s Sportswear Mfg. Ass’n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)).
263
NAT’L INST. DRUG ABUSE, COSTS OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE supra note 7 (estimating annual cost of
alcohol and drug abuse in relation to costs of healthcare, lost work productivity, and crime).
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quality and fraudulent sober living homes exerts far more pressure than a pinch
on this figure. Rather, the industry’s issues serve as a key contributor to the SUD
treatment gap, one of the federal government’s largest barriers in its battle
against SUD.264 Moreover, analysis of the MQSA below demonstrates Congress
has regulated local instances of intrastate economic activity under its commerce
powers, under remarkably similar circumstances, in the past.265
c.

Enacting Minimum Accreditation Requirements for Operation of a
Sober Living Constitutes a Reasonable Means for Congress to Address
the Negative Impacts of the Sober Living Industry on Interstate
Commerce

The final requirement for a federal law to prove constitutional under the third
Lopez category is that it constitutes a reasonable means for addressing an
activity’s negative impact on interstate commerce.266 Federal legislation setting
minimum accreditation requirements for operating a sober living home would
unquestionably meet this final prong.
Congress would be afforded substantial discretion in choosing its method for
removing the industry’s obstructions on commerce because operating a sober
living home constitutes an economic activity.267 Moreover, whether Congress
could have selected other reasonable methods for addressing the sober living
industry’s issues would not factor into this portion of the Court’s analysis.268 As
noted by the Court in Lopez, legislation regulating an economic activity will
virtually always be upheld as reasonable.269 The minimum accreditation
requirements chosen by Congress to address the negative impacts of
mammography centers in the MQSA, discussed below, demonstrate that the
similar means proposed by this Comment would be found reasonable in the
context of the sober living industry.270
A possible challenge to the reasonableness of the legislation proposed by
this Comment is refuted by examination of the Perez opinion.271 One could

264
Carroll, supra note 8; OFF. NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, supra note 9, at 12; see supra Introduction
for discussion of the treatment gap.
265
42 U.S.C.A. § 263(B); see infra Part IV.C.
266
Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258–59.
267
See id. at 261–62 (“How obstructions in commerce may be removed—what means are to be
employed—is within the sound and exclusive discretion of the Congress.”).
268
Id. at 261.
269
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
270
42 U.S.C.A. § 263(B); see infra Part IV.C.
271
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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object that a law requiring the accreditation of all sober living homes would
necessarily regulate all legitimate sober living homes, in addition to those run
by bad players. As exemplified by the loan sharking statute in Perez, reasonable
methods may sometimes necessitate regulations that “embrace more than the
precise” evil a regulation was created to target to effectively address a problem
in interstate commerce.272
C. The Mammography Quality Standards Act: Use of the Commerce Clause
Power to Regulate Ancillary Health Care Services
Although use of Commerce Clause authority to regulate in the health care
sector is unusual, the legislation proposed by this Comment would not be the
first time Congress has used this authority to regulate intrastate health care
activities. Enacted pursuant to Congress’s commerce powers in 1992, the
MQSA requires all mammography centers in the nation to meet minimum
quality standards and obtain accreditation from an approved accrediting body to
operate.273 Similarities between the need for the MQSA’s enactment and the
need for federal intervention in sober living industry further evidence that the
MQSA provides strong precedent for the legislation this Comment proposes.
The circumstances that led to the MQSA’s passage arose in the 1980s amidst
an effort by public and private health organizations to increase the utilization of
mammography screenings for early detection and prevention of breast cancer.274
Free-standing mammography screening centers rapidly proliferated across the
country with little oversight as demand for mammography screenings
increased.275 Much like the recent public response to issues in the sober living
industry, concerns regarding the quality and legitimacy of mammography
screening practice in the United States garnered the attentions of media outlets
and professional radiology organizations.276 Problems of poor quality screening
272

Id. at 154–55 (quoting Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 259 (1927)).
Mammography Quality Standards Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–539, 106 Stat. 3574 (1992) (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 263b); Harvey & Pandharipande, supra note 114, at 392 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 263b); Brian
Monnich, Bringing Order to Cybermedicine: Applying the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine to Tame
the Wild Wild Web, 42 B.C. L. REV. 455, 483 n.254 (2001) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 263b); see S. REP. NO. 102–
448, at 12 (1992) (asserting power to regulate interstate commerce as MQSA’s constitutional authority).
274
S. REP. NO. 102–448, at 3–4; Florence Houn, Kathleen A. Franke, Charles A. Finder, & Roger L.
Burkhart, The Mammography Quality Standards Act of 1992: History and Process, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 485,
486 (1995).
275
S. REP. NO. 102–448, at 5.
276
Houn et. al, supra note 274, at 486 (citing Chicagoland, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 1990, at 7; A Cancer
Unseen: Misdiagnosed and Dying, Victim Warned Other Women, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 7, 1993, (Metro. Region)
at 1; B. J. Conway, O. H. Suleiman, F. G. Rueter, R. G. Antonsen, & R. J. Slayton, National Survey of
Mammographic Facilities in 1985, 1988, and 1992, 191 RADIOLOGY 323 (1994); B.M. Galkin, S. A. Feig, & H.
273
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equipment, substandard screening procedure, false negative results, and
fraudulent representations of professional certification by providers spread
throughout the industry.277
One decade later, Congress determined that comprehensive, national
legislation was needed to replace the then “patchwork of federal, state and
private voluntary standards for mammography quality assurance.”278 The first
major effort to remedy issues in the mammography industry came from the
nonprofit American College of Radiology (ACR).279 The ACR created a
voluntary mammography accreditation program and disseminated resources that
promoted standards for quality assurance.280 Much like how NARR has been
limited in its ability to promote best practices and voluntary accreditation in the
sober living industry, ACR was unable to provide sufficient oversight on its
own.281 The poor quality and fraudulent facilities causing the mammography
industry’s problems were those least likely to voluntarily seek accreditation, and
ACR had no authority to close substandard or illegitimate facilities.282
Prior to utilizing its Commerce Clause authority to enact the MQSA, federal
regulation was limited to a fraction of mammography centers receiving
Medicare funds.283 Although some state governments attempted to fill in the
gaps, only approximately 20% of states had adopted comprehensive legislation
to prohibit operation of poor quality mammography facilities prior to the passage
of the MQSA.284 Currently, only 12% of states have adopted legislation that
comprehensively regulates the operation of sober living homes.285 Federal
D. Muir, The Technical Quality of Mammography in Centers Participating in a Regional Breast Cancer
Awareness Program, 8 RADIOGRAPHICS 133 (1988); L. Fintor, M. H. Alciati, R. Fischer, Legislative and
Regulatory Mandates for Mammography Quality Assurance, 18 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 81 (1995); R. Edward
Hendrick, Quality Assurance in Mammography: Accreditation, Legislation, and Compliance with Quality
Assurance Standards, 30 RADIOLOGIC CLINICS N. AM. 243 (1992)).
277
S. REP. NO. 102–448, at 5–6; Houn et. al, supra note 274, at 486 (citing Chicagoland, CHI. TRIB., May
7, 1990, at 7; A Cancer Unseen: Misdiagnosed and Dying, Victim Warned Other Women, BOS. GLOBE, at 1;
Conway et al., supra note 276).
278
H. R. REP. NO. 102–889, at 14 (1992).
279
What is ACR?, RADIOLOGICAL SOC’Y OF N. AM., https://www.radiologyinfo.org/en/info.cfm?pg=
about-acr#:~:text=The%20American%20College%20of%20Radiology,medical%20physicists%20and%20
radiation%20oncologists (last updated Jan. 6, 2020).
280
Houn et. al, supra note 274, at 486.
281
Id. Although 2,500 sober living homes are NARR accredited, this represents only a portion of the
mostly unaccounted for number of sober living homes in the United States. NARR, About Us, https://narronline.
org/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2020); NARR, supra note 10, at 9.
282
S. REP. NO. 102–448, at 13 (1992).
283
H. R. REP. NO. 102–889, at 14, 17.
284
Id. at 14–15.
285
Six states have laws requiring licensure, accreditation, or other certification for operating a sober living
home. Martin et al., supra note 18, at 5–6.
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Medicare oversight in the sober living industry is also severely limited because
sober living homes seldom take government or private insurance.286
The patchwork system of voluntary, state, and federal regulation that
necessitated meaningful federal intervention in the mammography industry is
the same system that is failing the sober living industry today. The MQSA
demonstrates that while employing commerce powers to regulate in the health
care sector is unconventional, the issues plaguing the sober living industry
necessitate an unconventional solution.
V. PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
This Part provides recommendations for how a piece of federal legislation
setting minimum standards and accreditation requirements for operation of a
sober living home could be structured and implemented. The MQSA and the
regulations that administer it supply a helpful blueprint for the legislation
proposed by this Comment.287
In general, federal legislation should establish clear, uniform standards of
quality and transparency that a sober living home must comply with to operate.
Such standards should provide SUD patients a mechanism for evaluating quality
and transparency that is reliable even when a patient is considering an out-ofstate facility. Additionally, these standards should specifically address and
prohibit the overutilization of drug testing and patient brokering.
Federal legislation must ensure non-government stakeholders have a hand in
developing these standards. The expertise of outside stakeholders is needed to
facilitate the sort of informed, substantive, and specific operating policies and
procedures that SAMHSA’s current sober living home guidelines lack.288 One
way that legislation could ensure stakeholder collaboration is by mandating
creation of a formal stakeholder advisory committee. The MQSA took this
measure in creating the National Mammography Quality Assurance Advisory
Committee, a group of outside stakeholders that advises HHS in developing

286
Close, supra note 40 (citing Douglas Polcin et al., Sober Living Houses for Alcohol and Drug
Dependence: 18-Month Outcomes, supra note 30).
287
Under the MQSA, a mammography facility must be both accredited by a Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approved accrediting body and pass inspection by FDA or FDA-approved inspectors. 42
U.S.C.A. § 263b(d)(1); Requirements for Certification, 21 C.F.R. § 900.11 (2018). HHS delegated
administration of the MQSA to the FDA. See 21 C.F.R. ch. I, sub. ch. I, pt. 900 (assigning MQSA duties to
FDA). A facility must comply with federal quality standards for procedure, equipment, and personnel to pass
inspection. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263b(d)(1).
288
See supra discussion in Part II.A.
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quality mammography standards and approving accrediting bodies.289 While the
SUPPORT Act gave HHS discretion to consult outside stakeholders “when
appropriate” in developing sober living home guidelines, creating a formal
mechanism for collaboration guarantees stakeholder expertise is heard.290
Stakeholders such as NARR, NCBH, and the Association for Addiction
Professionals have made clear they are willing to collaborate in federal
endeavors.291 Stakeholders possess an arsenal of comprehensive quality
standards and policies for deterring unethical drug testing and patient brokering,
which they are more than ready to bring to the table.292
Regarding accreditation, NARR is a clear example of an entity that could
serve as an approved accrediting body. The ACR, which played a role similar to
NARR as a leading voluntary accreditation provider prior to the MQSA, is now
one of three FDA-approved MQSA accrediting bodies.293 However, the
legislation proposed by this Comment could also allow for state health
departments to apply for approval as accrediting bodies. Under the MQSA, a
state can serve as an accrediting body for mammography facilities in its borders
if it enacts and enforces “laws that are at least as stringent as the” MQSA.294
Allowing states a similar opportunity to accredit their sober living homes could
help alleviate any lingering federalism-based opposition to federal intervention.
Lastly, the legislation proposed by this Comment should make clear that states

289

42 U.S.C.A. § 263b(n).
National Recovery Housing Best Practices, 42 U.S.C.A. § 290ee-5(a)(2).
291
See ASSOC. ADDICTION PRO., supra note 159, (urging “Congress to work with NAADAC and other
stakeholders in the addiction workforce to support national credentials”); Memorandum from Linda Rosenberg,
President & CEO of the Nat’l Council Behav. Health to the Honorable Elinore McCance-Katz, Assistant
Secretary for Mental Health and Substance Abuse, Proposed Recovery Housing Guidelines (Apr. 12, 2019),
https://www.thenationalcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/National-Council_Recovery-HousingProposed-Guidelines_Overall-Comments_4.12.2019.pdf?daf=375ateTbd56 (recommending SAMHSA utilize
its and NARR’s resources for developing sober living home guidelines).
292
See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL BEHAV. HEALTH, BUILDING RECOVERY: STATE POLICY GUIDE FOR
SUPPORTING RECOVERY HOUSING, supra note 14 (providing detailed sober living home quality standards in
collaboration with NARR); NARR, ETHICAL POLICIES REGARDING DRUG TESTING (2018), https://narronline.
org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/NARR-Drug-Testing-Policy.pdf; NARR, ETHICAL POLICIES REGARDING
INDUCEMENTS (2018), https://narronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/NARR-Ethics-Policy-Statement-2018Inducements.pdf (providing policies for addressing patient brokering).
293
FDA, MQSA: Accreditation Bodies, https://www.fda.gov/radiation-emitting-products/facility-certificationand-inspection-mqsa/mqsa-accreditation-bodies (last visited Jan. 28, 2021); see infra Part IV.C (comparing ACR
and NARR).
294
Suzanne V. Cocca, Who’s Monitoring the Quality of Mammograms? The Mammography Quality
Standards Act of 1992 Could Finally Provide the Answer, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 313, 343 (1993); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 263b(q). Currently, divisions of the Arkansas and Texas health departments are approved MQSA accrediting
parties. FDA, supra note 293.
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are free to regulate their sober living industries more stringently than federal
regulations if they wish.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between the law and SUD has made incredible strides in
keeping with the shift in the public’s understanding of SUD as a stigmatized
social problem to a treatable medical disorder.295 Yet, the sober living industry
persists as a life-threatening regulatory blind spot. The federal government must
expand its legislative approach to the SUD epidemic by undertaking innovative
measures to regulate aspects of SUD treatment. If the federal government wants
to close the 18.2 million person-wide treatment gap, then it must enact
meaningful regulation of the sober living industry, where the poor quality,
clinically inappropriate, fraudulent SUD services widening the treatment gap are
most prominent.296
There is no time to wait for the states to take action. An estimated 501
individuals die from SUD each day in the U.S., yet in 88% of states, bad players
remain free to profit off this life and death crisis.297 States that have taken action
are actively calling upon the federal government to take the reins.298 Although
Tenth Amendment concerns pose obstacles to federal intervention, these
obstacles can be, and should be, overcome. The federal government must get
creative and utilize its Commerce Clause powers to enact meaningful
intervention in the sober living industry.
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Sean M. Robinson & Bryan Adinoff, The Classification of Substance Use Disorders: Historical,
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